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INTRODUCTION
In 1890, a constitutional coup d'etat occurred. In a single decision, the
United States Supreme Court transformed the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment from a phrase requiring equal procedures to an
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unrestrainable mandate giving judges power to review most all state laws
touching life, liberty or property. A desperate quest for precedent and
direction have led successive Supreme Courts to find rights, liberties and
procedures in order to give content to the phrase "due process of law."
Contemporary due process is rootless and means anything the court wants
it to mean. This article proposes a constitutional amendment to define due
process of law and thus restore its original intent and meaning.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS
The Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their
adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent miscon-
struction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive
clauses shall be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence
in the Government, will best insure the beneficent end of its institution
The Preamble to the Bill of Rights, 17911
The colonists' experiences with Mother England forewarned them to avoid
the potential tyranny of centralized government. The government created
pursuant to the Articles of Confederation provided for no executive or
judicial branch, and no central government monopoly on printing money. 2
The Constitution was ratified, in part, in order to form a "more perfect"
Union, with power apportioned between the federal and state governments.
Without a written constitution, there was always the potential for clashing
sovereignties., Only principled construction of the writing could prevent one
government from destroying what the other was supposed to preserve.4
The Constitution is a document deeply distrustful of central government.'
In the Constitution, the important separation was not between the legislative,
1. See H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1926).
2. See C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11 (2d ed. 1968).
3. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall saw
the principal problem as one of clashing sovereignties-the tendency of one government to pull
down what the other has built up. He described this tension as the "incompatibility of a right
in one government to destroy what there is a right in another to preserve." Id. at 430. Perhaps
this accounts for his modest powers approach. Recent Supreme Courts follow this approach in
reviewing the exercise of congressional power over interstate commerce. See, e.g., Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the Public Accommodations sections of the 1964
Civil Rights Act under the commerce clause although the real purpose of the measure was to
advance social or race relations).
4. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851) (subject power analysis).
5. The Constitution placed several checks on Congress's power. For example, Congress
cannot appropriate money for armies for longer than two years. Congress can organize the
militia, but the power to appoint officers is reserved to the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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judicial and executive branches, but between the national government and
the states.6 Indeed, without free sovereign states, the United States would
have been just another government of three branches and thirteen provinces.
The first ten amendments to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, were
enacted to prevent the federal government from extending its powers.7 Yet
today, the purpose of the Bill of Rights, as expressed in its purpose or
preamble clause, lies hidden in convenient obscurity. Perhaps it is nowadays
better to forget that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to benefit, not
restrict, the powers of state government. 8
The Bill of Rights was the price exacted by the thirteen states for ratifying
the Constitution.9 Who could have imagined that these provisions would
become selectively adapted or incorporated as a restriction and restraint on
those states.
The Supreme Court first asserted jurisdiction to construe the language of
the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison.0 The Constitution did not specif-
ically provide for an arbitrator of disputes, and it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court made itself the ultimate voice of the Constitution. Nor is
there anything too controversial about McCulloch v. Maryland," in which
Chief Justice Marshall discussed the Court's "painful duty" to declare an
act unconstitutional where Congress (or the states), under the pretext of
executing powers, enacts laws for the accomplishment of objects not en-
trusted to the federal or state government.' 2 However, in McCulloch, Justice
Marshall added that "were the judiciary to inquire about the degree of the
necessity of laws, the Court would pass the line that circumscribes the judicial
department" and would tread on legislative ground. 3 Justice Marshall stated,
"This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power."' 14
6. See I H. VON HOIST, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
29-30 (1889). The Declaration of Independence spoke of "these United Colonies" as "free and
independent states. " The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis in original).
7. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1859 (1833).
8. See 2 J. TUCKER, THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNIrED STATES §§ 326-337 (1899).
9. J. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION § 98 (1867).
10. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
12. Id. at 423.
13. Id.
14. Id. Marshall's predecessor, Chief Justice Iredell, also claimed constitutional power to
void acts of legislatures. However, in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), he added:
I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature,
the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case. If, on
the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of
the Union, shall pass a law within the general scope of their constitutional power,
the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment,
contrary to the principles of natural justice.
Id. at 399.
1986]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 35:773
Throughout Chief Justice Marshall's term, numerous cases involving state
court judgments reached the Court.1" From the beginning, the Court em-
ployed the appellate power bestowed on it by the Judiciary Act of 178916 to
constitutionally validate such review practice. 7 Until the passage of the
fourteenth amendment, however, there were few prohibitions or reviewable
restrictions in the Constitution that addressed state laws.,'
Prior to the Civil War and the amendments to the Constitution that were
passed in its wake, Congress could not abolish slavery because each state
was free to grant or deny state citizenship. State citizenship was tied to the
rights to own property, contract, give evidence and vote. 19 The Bill of Rights,
enacted to "prevent misconstruction of powers" by the federal government,
was not binding or applicable to the state governments. 20 When Congress
attempted to confer federal citizenship to slaves in a newly admitted state,
a political Supreme Court struck down the statute in the infamous Dred
Scott v. Sandford2' decision.
To preserve the Union in the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress enacted
constitutional amendments to provide the emancipated slaves with the same
constitutional rights as whites had enjoyed since 1787. 22 Without the four-
15. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 (1827); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 1 (1823); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122 (1819); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816) (citing § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), as allowing review of final
decisions of state courts) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1985)).
16. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
17. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), and
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), the Court annulled state laws, but only for
violation of specific language in the Constitution prohibiting a state's actions.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
19. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422 (1856).
20. In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The question [is], we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty. The
Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual
states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution,
provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government,
as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a government
for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation and best
calculated to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this government
were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general
terms, are naturally, and, we think necessarily, applicable to the government created
by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself;
not of distinct governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes.
Id. at 246-47.
21. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
22. The thirteenth amendment abolished the institution of slavery. The first clause of the
fourteenth amendment conferred on blacks federal citizenship (overruling the Dred Scott
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teenth amendment, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court had the con-
stitutional power to force states to apply to their black residents the same
laws (equal protection) or procedures (due process) as applied to white
residents. The Civil War amendments attempted to promise blacks what
whites had always had.
Prior to the Civil War, state law was supposed to govern personal civil
and common law rights. 23 After the Civil War, Congress could have created
amendments to drastically realign this "old" federal balance between the
states and the central government. The federal government could have
imposed a single will upon the various states, destroying them as separate
entities and thereby guaranteeing racial equality. The thirteenth, fourteenth
or fifteenth amendments could have provided a constitutional Bill of Rights
(under Supreme Court stewardship) as everyone's new privilege and immu-
nity. But this would have mocked the theories of dual citizenship, two
constitutions, federal-state power apportionment, reserved rights and stated
powers. In short, it would have altered in material, non-racial ways the 1787
Union that the Civil War was fought to preserve. 24
II. THE DRED ScoT DECISION: SECRET KEY TO DuE PROCESS OF LAW
All trust in Constitutions is grounded on the assurance they may afford,
not that the depositories of power will not, but that they cannot misemploy
it.
John Stuart Mill
2
decision). The second clause of the fourteenth amendment conferred state citizenship upon
blacks. The remaining portion of the amendment promised blacks equality in state procedures
(due process) and state law (equal protection). See Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the
Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U. L. REv. 19 (1938); Graham, The Early Antislavery Back-
grounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 479.
Some commentators believe that the fourteenth amendment was never intended to incorporate
the Bill of Rights. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 68-132 (1949) (responding to Justice Black's dissent in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), which espoused incorporation). The handful of justices who
felt the fourteenth amendment incorporated the federal Bill of Rights were identified by Justice
Douglas in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This view has never commanded a
majority. See Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 746 (1964).
23. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954).
In United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S 542 (1875), a post-Civil War Supreme Court, speaking
of the nature of citizen rights and republicanism, wrote: "The equality of the rights of citizens
is a principle of republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its
citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power. That duty was originally assumed
by the States; and it still remains there." Id. at 555.
24. In a letter to the New York Tribune in 1862, President Lincoln wrote:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save
or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do
it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save
it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that.
New York Times Book Review, Feb. 8, 1987, at 34.
25. H. MENCKEN, A NEw DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 214 (1942).
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In 1856, the United States Supreme Court for the first time declared an
act of Congress in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 6 The Dred Scott decision resulted in the Court's invalidation of the
portion of the Missouri Compromise that prohibited slavery in certain ter-
ritories of the United States." Before the Civil War, Congress had no power
to free slaves because state law governed state citizenship.
Many blacks, however, were state citizens in the northern states. The
Missouri Compromise, a desperate measure to avoid the death knell of the
Union, sought to restrict the spread of slavery by allowing the new state of
Missouri to be slave while prohibiting slavery in certain territories of the
United States. Congress passed the Missouri Compromise under its law-
making power. Due process of law, however, was used to strike down the
law itself, not the process by which the law was enacted.
Dred Scott was a Missouri slave who was taken into a free state, Illinois,
and then to a territory where the Missouri Compromise prohibited slavery.
Several years after his return to Missouri, Scott sued for his freedom, which
he claimed through his residence in Illinois and the Louisiana territory. In
rejecting Scott's claim, the Supreme Court held that slaves were not citizens
for federal purposes, but rather "property. '2  The Court reasoned that
Congress could pass no law depriving citizens of property without due
process. The Missouri Compromise violated due process of law.29 Chief
Justice Taney wrote, "[Tihe rights of property are united with the rights of
person, and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the
Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
and property, without due process of law." 30 The Chief Justice noted that
for federal constitutional purposes, Scott was "property" and not a citizen.
An act of Congress legislating to the contrary, therefore, deprived Scott's
owner of his property interest in Scott without "due process of law.'",
26. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
27. Id. at 455 (Wayne, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 453.
29. Id. at 455 (Wayne, J., concurring). Von Hoist, author of a seven volume pre-Civil War
constitutional and political history of the United States, called the Dred Scott decision "an
invalid usurpation" and "an absurd and bold assumption, and morally ... an unparalleled
prostitution of the judicial ermine." 6 H. VON HOLST, supra note 6, at 46.
30. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450. Many state constitutions borrowed the phrase "due process"
in their documents. In Massachusetts, the phrase used was "according to the law of the land."
In those states, judges could set out common judge-made rules of due process in criminal and
civil matters, but legislation overriding the judges was also due process and entitled to supremacy.
See Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HAgv. L. REV.
366 (1911). "Indeed the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the Common Law as
they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances." Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 134 (1871).
31. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450. See also Wynehamer v. New York, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856);
Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366,
475 (1911).
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When taught in law school, the sole emphasis given Dred Scott is its
holding that slaves were mere property. The real significance of the Dred
Scott decision is that it is the first "substantive due process" case where the
Supreme Court construed due process to mean not procedures, but instead
utilized review "magic" to strike the merits of a duly enacted law. Dred
Scott was overruled by the first sentence of the post-Civil War fourteenth
amendment that reads "all persons born or naturalized in the United States
. . . are citizens of the United States ....
III. Coup D'ETAT: DUE PROCESS IN 1890 BECOMES THE JUDGES
The great question which, in all ages, has disturbed mankind and brought
on them the greatest part of those mischiefs which have ruined cities,
depopulated countries and disordered the peace of the world, has been
whether there is power in the world, not whence it came, but who should
have it.
John Locke13
In The Federalist Papers, Madison warned that if the judicial power were
"joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. '34
This is precisely what happened through application of substantive due
process. The United States Supreme Court possesses ultimate power to
command Congress, the executive or states on just about any subject re-
specting life, liberty or property. In one decision in 1890,15 the Supreme
Court transformed the due process clause from a recognition of Congress's
powers over its own procedures to a grant of legislative power to the supreme
judiciary. This coup d'etat occurred so that the Supreme Court could review
the adequacy of petty state railroad rate regulation in the post-industrial
revolution years of 1890 to 1900. To obtain the power, the Court changed
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
33. J. LocKiE, TREATISE oF GOVERNMENT (1690).
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 247 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff ed. 1948) (emphasis in original).
Madison takes great pains to point out that in England (and certain colonies) judges were part
of the legislative Parliament (House of Lords). The Constitution's separation of powers doctrine
was completely different:
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim, are a further demonstration
of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person or body," says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may
arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them
in a tyrannical manner." Again, "were the power of judging joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control,
for the judge would then be the legislator."
Id. (emphasis in original).
35. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). See infra notes
62-65 and accompanying text.
1986]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
the meaning of a curious British phrase called "due process of law."
The phrase "due process of law" comes from an early English statute
that read, "no man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put
out of Lands or Tenements, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor
put to Death, without being brought in answer by Due Process of the
Law." '3 6 This statute in turn is based on Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta,
which the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 paraphrases as, "No subject
shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, im-
munities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or
deprived of his life, liberty or estate, but by the judgment of his peers or
the law of the land." 37
In the 17th century, an English jurist, Sir Edward Coke, found a very
convenient use for this phrase to resolve a problem in his own day: was the
King a divine-right law unto himself or under the law? In one of the struggles
for supremacy between the King and Parliament in 1612, the question arose
whether the King could order the arrest of a free man without assigning a
reason for it. It was Coke's contention that law should not be governed by
the arbitrary will of the King, but by precedent and traditions like the Magna
Carta." The Magna Carta required the King to conform according to the
law of the land (per legem terrae) which, by custom, required notice, a
hearing, reasons, and in short, due process of law.39
Coke held that no man was above the law, for law was reason. 40 He stated
that reason was precedent and precedent was the Magna Carta, which said
that a man could not be deprived of liberty except per legem terrae (according
to the law of the land), or after due process of law. 4' At the time of Coke's
decision, it was not clear whether the King or Parliament (of which the
judiciary was to become part) was to be the supreme sovereign law-giver.
After Parliament became supreme, Coke would, as judge, rule that nobody
36. 24 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354).
37. Declaration of Rights, Art. XIII.
38. See Corwin, supra note 30, at 369-70.
39. The United States Constitution had provided in its fifth amendment that no man was
to be deprived of life, liberty or property without "due process of law." The issue was, however,
what agency or government was to legislate meaning or substance to due process. The definition
of due process is a function of will or law-making. Whether the state has acted according to
due process is a judicial question of judgment, intention, reason, and dispute resolution. Due
process meant that notice, fair procedures or hearings should be provided before taking an
individual's life, liberty, or property. In England at the time of the Magna Carta, King John,
rather than Parliament, was probably the lawmaker. In our country, Congress and the states
were to be the law-makers. We, however, borrowed a phrase from a non-constitutional country
that for five hundred years had convulsed with uncertainty whether mad kings, parliaments,
dictators or judges were the law-givers.
40. See Corwin, supra note 30, at 369-70.
41. For a decision of the relationship between due process and the per legem terrae, see
Corwin, supra note 30, at 369.
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could overrule Parliament. 42 Today the English Parliament is both lawmaker
(legislator) and enforcer (judge). The law Parliament enacts as legislator is
the law the judges of Parliament interpret and enforce as adjudicators.
Coke's equation of due process with law of the land prevented the King
from determining what due process was. The fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution provides that no person may be deprived of life, liberty
or property unless afforded "due process of law." '43 Due process meant
merely that notice, fair procedures or hearings should be provided before
laws could deprive one of life, liberty or property."
After the Confederacy lost the Civil War in 1865, Congress enacted the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to provide recently freed
slaves with a guarantee of equality in state laws and procedures. The thir-
teenth amendment abolished slavery. The fourteenth amendment gave federal
citizenship and the equal protection of state laws to all citizens. The fifteenth
amendment guaranteed the right to vote. The purpose of the fourteenth
amendment was to ensure that all states, especially those in the Old South,
afforded the new black citizens equality in state law (equal protection) and
state procedure (due process).45
The Slaughter-House Cases" of 1873 were the leading post-war cases
construing the meaning of the war amendments. It was first argued in those
cases that the amendments meant more than "black is white." Counsel for
appellant, John Campbell, a former Supreme Court Justice who sat on the
infamous Dred Scott Court, argued that the fourteenth amendment provided
something for everyone, including new privileges and immunities from state
government.4 7 The Supreme Court rejected any notion that the fourteenth
amendment privileges and immunities clause incorporated new rights. 4
Justice Miller wrote the majority decision. 9 He saw the danger of giving
petitioner's slaughter-house business some kind of new federal privilege of
immunity under the fourteenth amendment. Justice Miller noted that con-
struing the fourteenth amendment to permit the Court to incorporate things:
would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
states, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify
42. Id.
43. U.S. Const. amend. V.
44. Alexander Hamilton has written: "The words 'due process' have a precise technical
import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice." 3 A.
HAMILTON, HAMILTON'S HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC 207-08 (1801).
45. See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws",
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421, 432-43.
46. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
47. Id. at 55. As Campbell stated, privileges and immunities are "undoubtedly the personal
and civil rights which usage, tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common
sentiments of people have recognized as forming the basis of the institutions of the country."
Id.
48. Id. at 77-78.
49. Id. at 36.
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such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed
at the time of the adoption of this amendment .... [Ilt radically changes
the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to
each other and of both these governments to the people .... 0
The Slaughter-House decision left the privileges and immunities clause
with its original intent and purpose. The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment was, at first, ignored as an ultimate restraint on creative state
governments." All the due process clause was thought to do was provide
that blacks received the same notice, hearing or state procedures enacted for
whites.
Not every interest was satisfied by interpreting the fourteenth amendment
to refer only to race. In an age of moguls, combines, trusts and mergers,
businessmen felt they needed judicial protection from the oppressive police
power regulation left to the states by the Union of 1787. Interstate incor-
porators were determined to use the new race amendments for their own
purposes. Though it was established that federal judicial review of state
legislation was limited to express provisions of the Constitution (mostly the
no impairment of contract clause), special interests would not be deferred.
In the Slaughter-House Cases, Campbell argued that national citizenship
and state citizenship had, by force of the amendments, become the same.
Perhaps Campbell evoked this potentially broad interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment in protecting the rights of blacks so that the Court would
curtail the fourteenth amendment.5 2 Blacks did not get the benefits they were
promised in 1868. The race amendments of 1868 would instead become
derailed.
In Davidson v. New Orleans,5 3 decided in 1877, Justice Miller wrote that
an individual is accorded due process of law "when, as regards the issues
affecting it, he has, by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice,
according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a case. ' ' 14 Miller,
however, acknowledged just what Court petitioners were up to then, as now,
when he wrote:
But while it has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the
power of the States, only a very few years, the docket of this court is
crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that State Courts and
State Legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. There is here abundant evidence that
there exists some strange misconception of the scope of this provision as
found in the fourteenth amendment. In fact, it would seem, from the
character of many of the cases before us, and the arguments made in
them, that the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means of
50. Id. at 78.
51. Id. at 77.
52. R. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 149 (1965).
53. 96 U.S. 97 (1887).
54. Id. at 105.
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bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of
every unsuccessful litigant in a State Court of the justice of the decision
against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision
may be founded."
In Munn v. Illinois,5 6 the Supreme Court reviewed the right of Illinois to
fix maximum state charges for the storage of grain. This legislation restricted
the freedom of the Chicago grain monopoly. The Court in Munn upheld
the state law. Property affected with a public interest had always been
subjected to lawmaker's regulation.17 Settled canons of constitutional con-
struction left the Supreme Court no constitutional occasion to question the
reason or the ill wisdom in the exercise of constitutionally-allocated power.5"
Justice Field, a former railroad attorney, dissented in Munn v. Illinois
and also dissented in the Slaughter-House Cases. Field's objective was to
procure for the judiciary the power to review state legislative enactments
affecting private property interests on a sweeping basis.5 9 Evidencing the
same attitude, Mr. C. Marshall wrote an article in the American Law Review
calling for a constitutional amendment to overrule Munn as "contrary to
the spirit of our age and the character of our institutions. ' '60 Though Marshall
conceded the accuracy of Munn's legal tradition, he pined for what in a few
years would be the opinion of a majority of the Court: "Is there an
institutional spirit, existing as a part of our law, but unexpressed in consti-
tution or in statute, which a state or federal judge can claim as controlling
authority and which he may invoke against the legislative power?" 61
A constitutional amendment to expand the fourteenth amendment was
never proposed. Instead a coup d'etat occurred, for in 1890 the Court decided
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota.62 This decision
alone changed the review standard under the due process clause from whether
the state complied with procedures to whether in the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court the law under review was reasonable. The Court held,
55. Id. at 104.
56. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
57. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1887).
58. As the Supreme Court stated in Munn:
We know that this [rate of charge of service for use of public property] is a power
which may be abused; but there is no argument against its existence. For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts
.... For us the question is one of power not of expediency.
94 U.S. at 134.
Munn v. Illinois was in the great tradition of Chief Justice Marshall, who had written, in
Brown v. Maryland, "Questions of power do not depend upon the degree in which it may be
exercised. If it may be exercised at all, it must be exercised at the will of those in whose hands
it is placed." 25 U.S. 419, 439 (1827).
59. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 98 (1873).
60. Marshall, A New Constitutional Amendment, 24 AM. L. REv. 908, 913 (1890).
61. Id. at 914.
62. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
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"The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation
by a railroad company, involving as it does the element of reasonableness
both as regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a
question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its
determination. "6 In one fell swoop, the Court assumed the power to review
legislative enactments on the basis of a new due process. The Court would
determine whether lawmakers' acts violated a due process which reviews
substance, not process, and forbids arbitrary, capricious, oppressive, or
unfair legislation touching any subject of life, liberty or property.
Justice Bradley, in his dissenting opinion in Chicago, Milwaukee and St.
Paul Railway v. Minnesota, saw the consequence of the majority view:
They say in effect ... that the final tribunal or arbitrament is the judiciary
.... There must be a final tribunal somewhere for deciding every question
in the world. Injustice may take place in all tribunals. All human insti-
tutions are imperfect-courts as well as commissions and legislatures.
Whatever tribunal has jurisdiction, its decisions are final and conclusive
unless an appeal is given therefrom. The important question always is,
what is the lawful tribunal for the particular case? In my judgment, in
the present case, the proper tribunal was the legislature .... 64
As early as 1909, the prestigious Edwin S. Corwin saw the implications of
this new due process:
The truth is that the moment the court in its interpretation of the 14th
Amendment left behind the definite, historical concept of "due process of
law" as having to do with the enforcement of law and not its making,
the moment it abandoned, in its attempt to delimit the police power of
the state, its ancient maxim that the possibility that a power may be abused
has nothing to do with its existence, that moment it committed itself to a
course that was bound to lead, however, gradually and easily, beyond the
precincts of judicial power, in the sense of the power to ascertain the law,
into that of legislative power which determines policies on the basis of
facts and desires.65
It was once settled doctrine that the Supreme Court, when reviewing the
constitutionality of state legislation in reserved or police matters, such as
health, safety or crime, would ask only whether the questioned act bore a
relationship to the state's police power. The Court would rule only if the
state had the power and not whether its exercise was capricious, unreasonable
or arbitrary.6 The founding fathers, after all, had rejected a council of
63. Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 465 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
65. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 643,
670 (1909).
66. Even Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney (author of the Dred Scott decision),
seemed clear enough about state power prerogatives:
But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than the
powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions
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revision to improve or veto lawmakers. 67 After 1890, the question for due
process review became whether the acts were rational, capricious, arbitrary,
invidious, or offensive to various natural law formulae, none of which are
found in the Constitution.
6
1
There are several theories as to how "due process" was given substantive
content. Charles Beard believed that a conspiracy had occurred. 69 He wrote
that two railroad congressmen, Roscoe Conkling and John Bingham, had
deliberately inserted the phrase "due process" into the fourteenth amendment
so that courts would not be limited merely to protecting the colored race,
but would also be able to protect non-racial property or laissez-faire capi-
talism from state regulation. 70 In his work on American civilization, Beard
wrote:
By a few words skillfully chosen every act of every state and local
government which touched adversely the rights of persons and property
was made subject to review and liable to amendment by the Supreme
Court at Washington, appointed by the President and Senate for life and
far removed from local dealings and prejudices .... Thus, the triumphant
Republican minority, in possession of the federal government, and the
military power, under the sanction of constitutional forms, subdued the
states for all time to the unlimited jurisdiction of the federal Supreme
Court.7
The late Professor Louis B. Boudin rejected Beard's version of the due
process clause.7 2 Boudin attributed the due process revolution to both Dem-
ocratic judges and Republican appointees, each anxious to protect, by judicial
action, invested capital. 7 Boudin asserts that after Justice Field failed in the
Slaughter-House Cases, he turned to due process in his dissenting opinion
in Munn v. Illinois. Boudin further notes that due process "had hitherto
.... And when the validity of a State law making regulations of commerce is
drawn into question in a judicial tribunal, the authority to pass it cannot be made
to depend upon the motives that may be supposed to have influenced the legislature,
nor can the court inquire whether it was intended to guard the citizens of the State
from pestilence and disease, or to make regulations of commerce for the interests
and convenience of trade. Upon this question the object and motive of the State
are of no importance, and cannot influence the decision. It is a question of power.
License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847).
67. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 51, 64, 76, 87 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
68. A commentator has noted:
Here the convention is simply that there must be a text for any assertion of the
power of judicial review. Going without a text is like going naked ..... Writtenness
plays a central part in our constitutional tradition. A judge without a text is not
only streaking, if you will, he is usurping.
Gerety, Doing Without Privacy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 143, 145 (1981) (emphasis in original).
69. 2 C. BEARD, TtE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 111-14 (1930).
70. Id. at 112-13.
71. Id. at 113-14.
72. Boudin, supra note 22, at 24-25.
73. Id. at 19.
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gone practically unnoticed and was therefore a tabula rasa, or the empty
tablet, into which the Supreme Court could write anything it pleased. ' 74
Boudin contended that Justice Field, in his dissenting opinion in Munn,
sought to give the due process clause a revolutionary meaning, by making
that clause perform the service which the majority of the Supreme Court
had said could not be performed by the privileges and immunities clause.
Boudin concluded that though Justice Field's first attempt in Slaughter-
House was a failure, in the next twenty years he succeeded in making the
Supreme Court the arbiter of the whole range of our national economy. 7
After 1890, the constitutional phrase due process of law would mean more
than mere process. 76
In Lord Coke's day, the supremacy of one king over most men was
overcome by a fundamental law higher than all men. 77 In poetic irony, the
American democracy became overrulable by fundamental law determined by
five to nine judges. Lord Coke's due process of law consisted of restraint,
static precedent and binding tradition.7 Due process in America became
instead an escape from a written constitution, a mandate for change. Charles
Evans Hughes, later Chief Justice, would say in 1907 that "we are under a
Constitution but the Constitution is what the judges say it is." 79
74. Id. at 77.
75. Id. at 77. A perspicacious remark of Justice Miller, author of the Slaughter-House and
the Davidson decisions, is quoted in E. BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1936):
It is vain to contend the judges who have been, at the bar, the advocates of railroad
companies, and all the forms of associated capital, when they are called upon to
decide cases where such interests are in contest. All their training, all their feelings
are from the start in favor of those who need no such influence.
Id. at 205.
76. In 1887, Justice Miller, in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1887), wrote in
construction of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment: "It is not possible to hold
that a party .. .when, as regards the issues affecting it, he has, by the laws of the State, a
fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a case."
Id. at 105.
In Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1875), the Court, in a post-Civil War
due process state case, wrote: "Our authority does not extend beyond an examination of the
power of the courts to proceed at all." Id. at 481. Justice Miller found in Davidson that there
was due process "whenever by the laws of the state" (authorizing a public taking) there was
notice and trial. 96 U.S. at 104-05. Accord Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The difference in approach to due process
before and after 1890 is dramatized by Davidson, where public takings "cannot be said to
deprive the owner of his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be
to other objection." 96 U.S. at 105.
77. See Corwin, supra note 30, at 369.
78. See E. BATES, supra note 76, at 205 n.I.
79. See H. MENCKEN, supra note 25, at 215. After 1890, the Court became "flexible."
Between 1888 and 1918, approximately 725 cases were decided under the fourteenth amendment,
usually turning on the due process clause. E. BATES, supra note 75, at 205 n.l. Between 1879
and 1928, the Supreme Court used the fourteenth amendment to declare 220 police power
statutes unconstitutional. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALYSIS & INTER-
PRETATION 1418-70 app. (E. Corwin ed. 1964).
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IV. DUE PROCESS DEFINES REASONABLENESS (1 890-PRESENT)
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest
and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court
could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature
(possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the
opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of
natural justice.
Justice Iredell'o
In 1890, the Supreme Court first construed the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to forbid states from depriving individuals of eco-
nomic liberties8 whenever the Court found the law unreasonable. This liberty
version of due process of law is sometimes referred to as substantive due
process.8 2 Let us call it the reasonableness test. After due process was
construed to require reasonableness, the Supreme Court had the power to
invalidate any state law regulating liberty or property that it considered
arbitrary.
The reasonableness test of due process is supposedly out of fashion. A
typical disclaimer in this area might include Justice Black's dissent in the
1969 case of Tinker v. Des Moines School District."3 Tinker held an Iowa
school's regulation banning the wearing of armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War unconstitutional. Justice Black observed:
There was at one time a line of cases holding "reasonableness" as the
court saw it to be the test of a "due process" violation .... The Ferguson
case [Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)] totally repudiated the old
reasonableness-due process test, the doctrine that judges have the power
to hold laws unconstitutional upon the belief of judges that they "shock
the conscience" . . . or some other such flexible term without precise
boundaries. I have many times expressed my opposition to that concept
80. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 399 (1798). See supra note 14.
81. From 1890 to 1937 the Court struck down as capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable,
numerous state and federal laws that regulated business liberty. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (statute forbidding mining struck down); Adams v.
Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597 (1917) (employment agency regulation overruled); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (prohibition of yellow-dog labor contracts struck down); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (maximum hours overruled); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897) (regulation of insurance companies overruled).
82. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Court spoke not merely of the
physical liberty of the person (corporation), but of the liberty to be free in the employment of
one's faculties and livelihood, including the liberty of contract that was necessary, proper or
essential to carrying out these purposes. Id. at 589.
Most commentators identify the Allgeyer decision as the first "reasoned decision actually
holding that the substance of economic legislation violated the due process clause." W.
LOCKHART, Y. KisAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 434 (5th ed. 1980).
83. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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on the ground that it gives judges power to strike down any law they do
not like.1
The reasonableness test of due process has by no means disappeared.
Newer restrictions on laws dealing with speech, assembly, religion or privacy
must be reasonable to pass constitutional muster."5 Today's liberties of
privacy, speech, autonomy, family living or sexual preference are conditioned
by the 1890 mandate of substantive due process.8 6 In Truax v. Corrigan,
8 7
Chief Justice Taft determined that the "fundamental principles of right and
justice" in the fourteenth amendment commanded the issuance of an in-
junction sought by a property owner to enjoin peaceful picketing at his place
of business. Nineteen years later, in American Federation of Labor v.
SwingA the same conduct was measured by the due process clause. However,
at the hands of a different majority, the Court did not command, but rather
forbade constitutional relief.89
A more recent and controversial discovery, in Roe v. Wade,9° that liberty
and due process guaranteed the right to a first trimester abortion has no
84. Id. at 519-20 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342
U.S. 421, 425 (1952) (Court upheld a statute requiring employers to pay for time employees
spent voting).
85. Commercial speech, symbolic speech, press coverage rights, lobbying, communication
access or promotional advertising by an electric utility inevitably requires a weighing of
countervailing federal and state interests. As Mendelson wrote on the first amendment and the
judicial process, "Balancing seems to me the essence of the judicial process-the nexus between
abstract law and concrete life .... Surely the choice is simply this: shall the balancing be done
'intuitively' or rationally." Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply
to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479, 481-82 (1964).
In the religion area, courts strive to strike a rational balance between the establishment clause
and the free exercise clause. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
86. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (10th ed. 1980). For example, in Richards v.
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970), the Court held:
[Wie believe that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes
a sphere of personal liberty for every individual, subject to reasonable intrusions
by the state in furtherance of legitimate state interests .... We do not say that
the governance of the length and style of one's hair is necessarily so fundamental
as those substantive rights already found implicit in the "liberty" assurance of the
Due Process Clause, requiring a "compelling" showing by the state before it may
be impaired. Yet "liberty" seems to us an incomplete protection if it encompasses
only the right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with those
personal aspects of our lives which have no direct bearing on the ability to enjoy
their liberty. As the court stated in Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891): "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law."
Id. at 1284-85.
87. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
88. 312 U.S. 321 (1940).
89. 1d. at 326.
90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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more textual basis than the discredited Lochner Court's finding of a liberty
to operate a sweat shop. 91 It matters little whether "liberty" is economic or
spiritual. The important and dispositive issue in determining whether there
has been a violation of due process is whether the taking of that liberty is
a reasonable deprivation in the opinion of a Supreme Court majority. 92 As
the due process clause's very scope continues to expand, a reasonableness
requirement still remains. In some areas, the burden of proving that laws
are reasonable will be relaxed or embellished, depending on the liberty
involved and the values of the judge. The governing standard of reason-
ableness remains, however, as the benefit of an 1890 Supreme Court decision
that changed the meaning of the words due process of law from required
procedures to anything, and eventually everything.
V. DuE PROCESS SELECTIVELY AMENDS TO STATES SOME FEDERAL
BILL OF RIGHTS (1897-PRESENT)
We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the states any of
the provisions, of the first eight Amendments as such.
The relevant historical materials have been canvassed by this Court and
by legal scholars. These materials demonstrate conclusively that Congress
and the members of the legislatures of the ratifying States did not contem-
plate that the Fourteenth Amendment was a short-hand incorporation of
the first eight amendments making them applicable as explicit restrictions
upon the States.
Justice Frankfurter 93
Despite this statement, and numerous others like it, the Court's construc-
tion of the due process clause belies its own holdings.9 4 In Chicago, Bur-
91. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
92. See Graglia, Judicial Review on the Basis of "Regime Principles": A Prescription for
Government by Judges, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 435 (1985). The laws could be school regulations or
even a liberty to refuse anti-psychotic drugs in a state hospital. See, e.g., Miller v. Gillis, 315
F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (dress code requiring short hair violated the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause). Assuming that Miller had a right to wear his hair long while attending
public school, the test which we must apply to determine the validity of the hair regulation is
that set out by Chief Justice Hughes in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937):
"Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process." Id. at 391.
93. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959).
94. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 656 (1948) ("After exhaustive consideration of the
subject, this Court has decided that the Fourteenth does not, through its due process clause or
otherwise, have the effect of requiring the several states to conform .. to the precise procedure
of the federal courts ...or Bill of Rights"); Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, 447 (1904) ("It
is well established that the first eight articles of the amendments .. .have reference to powers
1986]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
lington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago," the city of Chicago condemned a
railroad right-of-way in order to widen a public street. The defendant received
notice and an opportunity to be heard at the condemnation hearing. The
Illinois Constitution required the payment of compensation for the taking
of property for public uses. 96 The jury awarded the railroad one dollar. Not
satisfied with the award in the state court, the railroad appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, seeking a determination of "[t]he circumstan-
ces under which the final judgment of the highest court of a state in a
proceeding instituted to condemn such property for public use may be
reviewed by this court. ' 97 The Supreme Court in 1897 held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibited states from taking
property from private persons without just compensation.98 Thus, for the
first time, a clause in the federal Bill of Rights was incorporated into the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. When due process was
defined to mean "no taking Without just compensation," the Supreme Court
obtained massive new jurisdiction to determine what state laws constituted
a "taking" and whether payment, if any, was just. 99
exercised by the government of the United States, and not to those of the States"); Bollen v.
Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 88 (1900) ("This court has also repeatedly held that the first eight
amendments to the Constitution applied only to the Federal courts"); Brown v. New Jersey,
175 U.S. 172, 174 (1899) ("The first Ten Amendments ... contain no restrictions on the
powers of the State, but were intended to operate solely on the Federal Government");
Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 34 (1890) ("the first eight articles of the
amendments to the Constitution have reference to powers exercised by the government of the
United States and not to those of the States"); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 166 (1887) ("The
first ten articles of amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the States").
95. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
96. Id. at 228.
97. Id. at 233.
98. Id. at 236.
99. Id. The process of reading into the fourteenth amendment the restrictions of the Bill
of Rights is called "incorporating" into due process selected phrases and amendments. Once
any clause becomes incorporated, the Supreme Court obtains new jurisdiction to review all
state cases relating to the rights incorporated. All state courts, and every town in America,
must thereafter respect on a uniform basis the Supreme Court's construction of the incorporated
subject area. In 1897, the Court paused before incorporating into due process the fifth
amendment right to just compensation for state takings. This new jurisdiction was accomplished
through the affirmation of a state verdict, and resembles Marbury v. Madison, where Justice
Marshall granted President Jefferson his appointment and simultaneously obtained the power
to construe the Constitution for the Supreme Court. The taking clause had been reviewed only
twenty years before in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877), where the Supreme Court
wrote:
It may violate some provisions of the State Constitution against unequal taxation;
but the Federal Constitution imposes no restraint on the states in that regard, if
private property be taken for public use without just compensation, it must be
remembered that when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted the provision in
that subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth amendment with the one we
are construing, was left out and this was taken.
Id. at 105.
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The second expansion of due process occurred in Gitlow v. New York.l°°
Justice Sanford, while casually affirming a World War I pamphleteer's
conviction under a New York anarchy statute, noted:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and
of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridg-
ment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and "lib-
erties" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States .... 10
Thus, in dicta (because the Court nevertheless affirmed Gitlow's conviction)
and without mention of contrary rulings, which in Justice Sanford's words
"so frequently held as not to warrant citation," the first amendment was
incorporated through the due process clause. In one short sentence, four-
teenth amendment due process meant speech rights in states, thereby giving
the Supreme Court immense new power.
Liberty originally meant freedom from physical restraint.l °2 After the coup
d'etat, the Court would speak not merely of the physical liberty of the
person or corporation, but of the "liberty to be free in the employment of
the faculties, including liberty of contract necessary, proper or essential to
successfully carry out these purposes." 103 In 1925, Charles Warren predicted
that succeeding Courts would eventually incorporate the whole Bill of Rights
into due process. 1 Warren wrote, "The word liberty seemed an especially
convenient vehicle into which to pack all kinds of rights.' 0 5
100. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
101. Id. at 666. Three years before Gitlow, the Court had written in Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922), "but as we have stated neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
any other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any
restrictions about 'freedom of Speech' or the 'liberty of silence." Id. at 543.
102. See Shattuck, "Liberty, " The True Meaning of the Term in those Clauses in the Federal
and State Constitutions which Protect "Life, Liberty and Property", 4 HARv. L. REv. 365
(1891). Another commentator has noted:
The phrase, "life, liberty or property without due process of law" came to us from
the English common law . . . the word "liberty" meant simply "liberty of the
person," or, in other words the right to have one's person free from physical
"restraint." It did not include all a person's civil rights. It was not, in any way,
the equivalent of "privileges and immunities." When the American States embodied
the Bills of Rights in their early Constitutions, from 1780 to 1787, substantially
every State inserted a provision that no person should be deprived of his life, liberty
or property "without due process of law," or except "by the law of the land."
There is no intimation in legal or historical documents of those days that this phrase
in the Bill of Rights in those early State Constitutions meant anything more than
it meant at common law-in other words, the "liberty," so referred to, meant
"freedom from physical restraint of the person."
Warren, The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REv. 431, 440
(1925) (footnotes omitted).
103. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
104. Warren, supra note 102, at 460.
105. Id. at 439.
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The raison d'etre of the rights incorporation process did not come until
twelve years after the first amendment speech guarantees were made an
implicit "fundamental" right of due process of law. In 1937, Justice Cardozo
described this strange pursuit in Palko v. Connecticut.°6 Cardozo wrote,
"Whatever would be a violation of the original Bill of Rights (amendments
I to VIII) if done by the federal government is now unlawful by force of
the Fourteenth Amendment phrase due process if done by a state."10 7
Cardozo refused to accept total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Only
those Bill of Rights provisions "rooted in the tradition and conscience of
our people" would be made binding on states. In affirming a state conviction
for murder over a double jeopardy claim, Cardozo asked: "Is that kind of
double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so acute
and shocking that our policy will not endure it? Does it violate those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions?"'' 0
Cardozo's standard for determining whether a federal right or liberty
would be incorporated into due process was whether the particular liberty
was "implicit in ordered liberty." A Constitution is supposed to be explicit.
Double jeopardy was not fundamental in 1937 but became so in a 1969
when the Warren Court overruled Palko.109 One might wonder why double
jeopardy was not at the base of all our civil and political institutions in
1937, or even 1967, but became so in 1969.110
The separation of church and state clause was incorporated in a series of
state cases in the 1930's-1940's."' A "watered down" search and seizure
fourth amendment was incorporated into due process in 1949 without the
exclusionary rule." 2 Twelve years later, in Mapp v. Ohio, "1 3 the exclusionary
rule was incorporated into due process. The Mapp decision gave the Supreme
Court power to determine what is a "reasonable" search for every court
and hamlet in the country.
Some rights in the Bill of Rights, like the right to an indictment, the right
to bear arms, or the seventh amendment right to a civil jury have never
been incorporated into due process." 4 The evolution of decisions interpreting
the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause demonstrates that the due
106. 302 U.S. 320 (1937).
107. Id. at 323.
108. Id. at 328.
109. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
110. Double jeopardy has not been construed to disallow successive prosecutions by state
and federal government for the same conduct or offense.
111. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 350 (1931).
112. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
113. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
114. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296
(1877); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532, 557 (1874).
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process incorporation analysis is only slightly less arbitrary than the 1890
Court's reasonableness test.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was made appli-
cable to the federal government only by the amending Bill of Rights of
1791." 5 Four of the original thirteen states did not preface their constitutions
with a separate bill of rights. 1 6 None of these four secured the fifth amend-
ment phrase "nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself."" 7 After the passage of the fourteenth amendment,
the Bill of Rights was repeatedly held inapplicable to the states."' The
Supreme Court, in Twining v. New Jersey, held that the privilege against
self-incrimination was not fundamental, and thus inapplicable to the states." 9
Forty years later, Justice Frankfurter would write, in a five-to-four decision,
that the matter "no longer called for discussion.' °2 0 Then in 1964, the
privilege of freedom from self-incrimination became, by a five-to-four vote,
one of the "principles of a free government.''2 Such are the fruits of a
coup d'etat due process without roots.
VI. DUE PROCESS REVIEWS CONGRESS
The current conception of due process has caused more havoc than has
any other constitutional doctrine. It has doomed workmen's compensation,
minimum wages, regulation of the hours of labor, regulation of various
kinds of businesses, the establishment of railroad pensions, and a great
variety of taxes. It is time the original meaning of the phrase, a purely
procedural one, be restored.
Osmond K. Fraenkel22
115. In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7. Pet.) 242 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall remarked:
"Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the
several states, by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their
own governments, in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this
purpose in plain and intelligible language." Id. at 249.
116. Of the four states that did not preface their constitutions with a separate bill of rights
(New Jersey, New York, Georgia, and South Carolina), none secured the right against self-
incrimination. See L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 405-522 (1968); 8 J. WIoMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2250 (1940).
117. Id.
118. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Bute v. Illinois, 33 U.S. 640 (1948); Lloyd v.
Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904); Bollen v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83 (1900); Brown v. New Jersey,
175 U.S. 172 (1899); Eilenbedker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31 (1890); Spies v. Illinois,
123 U.S. 131 (1887).
119. 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908) ("If the people of New Jersey are not content with the law as
declared in repeated decisions of their courts, the remedy is in their own hands").
120. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
121. In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964), the Court stated, "In thus returning to the
Boyd view that the privilege is one of the 'principles of a free government,' Mapp necessarily
repudiated the Twining concept of the privilege as a mere rule of evidence." (Citation and
footnotes omitted).
122. Fraenkel, The Value of Judicial Review, 141 NATION 42 (1935).
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In 1890, due process became applicable to all state laws, not just those
concerned with race and procedure. Thereafter, conservative Supreme Courts
began to invalidate state social legislation in a wide variety of areas including
mine safety, minimum working hours for women and children, and union
labor laws.12 1 When the federal government attempted to enact the same
kind of social legislation using congressional law-making power it met a wall
of frost by construction of the fifth amendment due process clause, 24 a
phrase always binding on the federal government. The Supreme Court then
began to use fourteenth amendment due process cases as precedent for fifth
amendment due process review. The Court considered the two due process
clauses so similar that it cited state cases arising under the fourteenth
amendment with federal cases under the fifth amendment without distin-
guishing between the two clauses. 125
Due process nearly killed the New Deal, as the National Recovery Act,
the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the Guffey Coal Bill were declared
unconstitutional in quick succession.1 26 The conservative members of the
Court were unable to perceive the reasonableness of statutes regulating
health,, safety, wages and hours. Congress was so frustrated that a law was
proposed which would have provided for automatic impeachment of any
Supreme Court Justice who voted to declare an act of Congress unconsti-
tutional. 27 President Roosevelt threatened to pack the Court in order to out-
vote the conservative members and force change or retirement. This was
similar to the threats made in early twentieth-century England to increase
the membership of the House of Lords if it continued to veto measures of
the popularly elected House of Commons. 2 A switch in nine came just in
time.
123. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 402-03 (1922) (overrruling
state mining safety regulations); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1917) (overruling
employment agency regulation); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (overruling prohibition
of yellow-dog labor contracts).
124. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 172 (1908). See also Barley v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (an unsuccessful
effort to use the Federal taxation power to regulate child labor in the states). Most of the
commerce clause cases from 1910-1927 were also attacked as unfair and unreasonable violations
of liberty and due process. See Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme
Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 944 (1927).
125. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949) (Justice Black refers to discredited Adair-Coppage line of cases, though one is federal
and the other a state case). See also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423-
25 (1952) (Justice Douglas disparaged the activist liberty of contract line of cases).
126. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (declaring National
Recovery Act unconstitutional); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1935) (declaring Agricultural
Adjustment Act unconstitutional); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (declaring
Guffey Coal Bill unconstitutional).
127. See Note, Shall Due Process of Law be Abolished, 58 AM. L. REv. 290, 291 (1924).
128. The Parliament Act of 1911 was passed under the threat of asking King George VI to
create sufficient liberal peers to ensure its passage through the House of Lords. B. CRICK, THE
REFORM OF PARLIAMENT 106 (1965).
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In 1937, the Court upheld by a five to four vote a minimum wage law in
the State of Washington. 29 With the appointment of William 0. Douglas
and Congressman Hugo Black, the Supreme Court's change in focus became
firmly entrenched. The Court would give only minimal review to federal and
state laws touching upon mere economic concerns, such as employment, 130
product safety 3' or business regulation. 32 These laws were presumed con-
stitutional. The Court assumed a valid legislative purpose, and a person
challenging the law had an embellished burden to show that the law had
absolutely no rational basis. The Court began a policy of non-intervention
where legislation affected mere economic property or business liberty, " and
repeatedly refused to weigh the wisdom of legislation in economic matters.' 34
While state and federal statutes regulating economic matters became subject
to minimal review, 33 different "preferred" rights such as speech and privacy
became subject to more careful scrutiny. 36
VII. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS: DuE PROCESS BY ANOTHER NAME
The "equal protection" analysis of the Court is, I submit, a "wolf in
sheep's clothing," for that rationale is no more than a masquerade of a
supposedly objective standard for subjective judicial judgment as to what
state legislation offends notions of "fundamental fairness." Under the
rubric of "equal protection" this Court has in recent times effectively
substituted its own "enlightened" social philosophy for that of the legis-
lature no less than it did in the older days the judicial adherents of the
now discredited doctrine of "substantive" due process.
Justice John Harlan 37
The fourteenth amendment was adopted after the Civil War to guarantee
equality among the races in state law (equal protection) and procedure (due
process).,3 Because the Constitution did not prohibit racial inequality before
129. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
130. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
131. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
132. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
133. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). But see United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
134. In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Court refused to sit as a "superlegislature
to weigh the wisdom of legislation," and emphatically refused to "go back to the time when
courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought."' Id. at 731-32.
135. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REy. 34, 44.
136. United States v. Carolone Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
137. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original).
138. The pre-Civil War due process clause of the Fifth Amendment was discussed in Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Irprovement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856).
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the Civil War, states freely practiced oppression of minorities through their
laws. It is important to note that the equal protection clause referred expressly
to state law and not federal law. 39 Where state law promised nothing, equal
protection did not apply.140
Originally, equal protection was not concerned with inequality with respect
to business, sex or taxes. Nor did equal protection encompass the right to
vote in state elections, which on a racial basis was protected by the fifteenth
amendment.' 14 The same Court that changed the definition of due process
also altered the original meaning of equal protection. In Chicago, Milwaukee
and St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota, 42 the Court held that unreasonable
freight rates deprived the railroad of equal protection of the laws. The Court
stated that "insofar as it is thus deprived while others are permitted to
receive reasonable profits from their invested capital the company is deprived
of the equal protection of the laws."'" Equal protection after 1890 would
no. longer refer exclusively to a promise of racial equality in the application
of state laws.
Today equal protection of the law generally bars irrational, arbitrary,
irrelevant, unreasonable or invidious state classifications.44 There are at least
two kinds of equal protection: economic equal protection and modern equal
protection. There is one test for legislation that impacts on fundamental
rights or "suspect" classifications, such as race or alienage. State laws on
these subjects must be for compelling state goals. There is a second test for
legislation touching non-suspect classifications. This legislation need only be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest."45
In Strauder v. Virginia,'"1 the Court struck down on an equal protection
basis a statute forbidding blacks from serving on juries. This 1880 decision
represents one of the last equal protection cases to apply the clause's original
intent.
Justice Douglas, in an appendix to his 1970 opinion in Oregon v. Mitch-
ell, 147 set out those cases where the Supreme Court struck down under the
equal protection clause state statutes that discriminated on a basis other than
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Section five of the fourteenth amendment provides, "The
Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article."
140. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1879).
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The fifteenth amendment forbids states to deny or abridge
the right to vote "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude."
142. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
143. Id. at 452.
144. See, e.g., Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, the Middle Tier and the
Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 525, 550 (1980) (excellent chart prepared by Fox that
summarizes equal protection analysis).
145. Id. The various views of the current Court toward equal protection review can be found
in a zoning case involving mental retardation. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
146. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
147. 400 U.S. 112, 150-52 (1970).
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race. In this appendix, the first case he cites is Gulf, Colorado and Santa
Fe Railway v. Ellis, 14s an 1896 decision where the Court held that a Texas
statute requiring railway companies to pay attorneys' fees to parties suc-
cessfully suing them denied the railroads equal protection of the law. This
decision is nothing more than a post-coup d'etat due process decision re-
quiring non-racial classifications to be reasonable. 49 This is not the inquiry
that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended when they required
equality in state substantive law. Instead, it is a version of due process which
forbids unreasonable legislation.
Today, any state law that classifies things or people differently by failing
to include enough people (under-inclusive laws) or by including too many
(over-inclusive laws) is subject to a colorable contention that it discriminates
in violation of the equal protection clause. 50 A law may discriminate on its
face or treat people differently as applied. Equal protection today is not just
race related.' 5'
At first, the 1890's version of equal protection was surrounded by a
presumption that any legislation was reasonable. This was accompanied by
a heavy burden to prove that no set of facts could justify the measure. In
a 1927 challenge to a state statute that required sterilization of the mentally
ill, the Court dismissed the equal protection argument as being the last resort
of constitutional argument.5 2 Fifteen years later, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,'
the Court invalidated another sterilization law as an equal protection vio-
lation.1 4 In 1890, equal protection prohibited states from enacting legislation
148. 165 U.S. 150, 153 (1896).
149. The Ellis decision highlights the transition from race (the original equal protection) to
a liberated 1896 capital era version:
But it is said that it is not within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to
withhold from States the power of classification, and that, if the law deals alike
with all of a certain class it is not obnoxious to the charge of a denial of equal
protection. While, as a general proposition, this is undeniably true, yet it is equally
true that such classification cannot be made arbitrarily. The State may not say that
all white men shall be subjected to the payment of the attorney's fees of parties
successfully suing them, and all black men not. It may not say that all men beyond
a certain age shall be alone thus subjected, or all men possessed of a certain wealth.
These are distinctions which do not furnish any proper basis for the attempted
classification. That must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable
and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and
can never be made arbitrarily, and without any such basis.
Id. at 153 (citations omitted).
150. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341,
348-53 (1949).
151. For a list of classes which have been held discriminated against and the rights affected,
see Antieau, The Jurisprudence of Interests and Adjudication of Equal Protection Controversies,
57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 831, 835-36, 838-39 (1980).
152. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
153. 316 U.S. 537 (1942).
154. Id. at 541.
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without some reasonable basis. Those who challenged a classification carried
the burden of proof. After 1940, certain suspect criteria affecting funda-
mental rights triggered strict scrutiny, and legislation would be held to deny
equal protection unless the state could demonstrate a compelling interest.",
Today, equal protection review is based on the the character of the
classification, the individual in the allegedly discriminated class, and the
state's interest in support of whatever classification appears in the statute.
The almost insurmountable obstacles found in activist due process analysis
still remain. In a case challenging a statute requiring state police to retire at
fifty, Justice Marshall bitterly complained that:
[Although] the Court outwardly adheres to the two-tier model, it has
apparently lost interest in recognizing further "fundamental" rights and
"suspect" classes. In my view, this result is the natural consequence of
the limitations of the Court's traditional equal protection analyses. If a
statute invades a "fundamental" right or discriminates against a "suspect"
class, it is subject to strict scrutiny. If a statute is subject to strict scrutiny,
the statute always, or nearly always is struck down."1
6
By describing a state law's ends as important, cogent, paramount or
fundamental, or its means as invidious, rational, least drastic or subordi-
nating, the Supreme Court engrafts their own undemocratic judicial values
under the guise of describing a state's burden of proof. There is no legitimacy
to this process. 157
The Supreme Court's unequal treatment of congressional efforts to
implement fourteenth amendment equality bears contrast. Section five of the
fourteenth amendment explicitly gives Congress the power to enforce the
amendment. In Baker v. Carr,'5 8 the Court cast aside its reluctance to decide
political questions in order to invalidate, as a violation of equal protection,
archaic state voting laws. Eight years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 5 9 Congress
attempted to give the right to vote in federal and state elections to eighteen-
year-olds. Four justices thought the whole scheme was unconstitutional since
the fifteenth, not the fourteenth, amendment concerned the vote. Two
justices thought it was unequivocably constitutional, and the remaining
justices, by a mere plurality, upheld the measure as applied to federal
elections only.'16
155. See Michelman, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 17 n.25 (1969); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the
Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula", 16 UCLA L. REv. 716, 719-20 (1969).
156. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1965) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
157. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (discussing application
of equal protection by earlier Supreme Courts).
158. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
159. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
160. Several months after the Mitchell decision, the twenty-sixth amendment was ratified.
The amendment provides that the federal and state government may not deny the vote "on
account of age" to citizens "eighteen years of age or older." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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The drafters of the United States Constitution intended that the docu-
ment be construed as originally written unless amended in accordance with
the process provided for in article IV. Original equal protection required not
rationality, but consistency. The unvarnished truth is that "strict," "ra-
tional" and "in-between" versions of equal protection are nothing more
than the 1890 rule of reason misconstructions of the phrase "due process of
law.' 1 61
VIII. FIRST AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.
Constitution of the State of New York 62
The first amendment forbids Congress from abridging freedom of speech
or the press. The framer's intent was to forbid prior restraint and censor-
ship.' 63 In the 1925 decision of Gitlow v. New York,' 64 a draft protester was
convicted of criminal anarchy by speech and advocacy. In affirming Gitlow's
conviction, speech liberty was casually incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. Justice Sandford wrote:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and
of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridg-
ment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and "lib-
erties" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States.161
All state constitutions have their own free speech guarantees.' 66 Gitlow,
however, gave the Supreme Court massive new jurisdiction to determine on
a uniform basis what is speech and when it can be regulated, infringed or
punished by the states. Because the 1890 court had already found that all
laws regulating liberty were required to be reasonable, a path had been
hewed to review state restrictions on liberty of speech or the press.
A few years before Gitlow, Justice Holmes set forth a first amendment
test to determine when speech could be punished. In Schenk v. United
161. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Justice Harlan wrote in his dissent: "In
my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as
the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case." Id. at 554. This is so because the
Plessy majority opinion is in fact a Dred Scott due process inquiry not whether separate was
equal, but whether the whole scheme was reasonable.
162. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
163. See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1942).
164. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
165. Id. at 666.
166. For a survey of state constitutions, see State Constitutional Law, NAT'L. L.J., Sept. 29,
1986, at S6.
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States,1 67 the defendants were convicted of seeking to disrupt the military's
effort to recruit personnel. Justice Holmes formulated the "clear and present
danger" test as follows:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. 6 8
The clear and present danger test stressed neither the language nor the words
themselves, but rather the time and the context in which they were used. A
debate between Justices Frankfurter and Black ensued in the 1940's as to
the true meaning of clear and present danger. Was it a universal test for
speech or just a tidy formula now being applied in multitudinous state cases?
In a "loudspeaker" case, 69 Justice Frankfurter complained:
My brother Reed speaks of "the preferred position of freedom of
speech." This is a phrase that has uncritically crept into some recent
opinions of this Court. I deem it a mischievous phrase, if it carries the
thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law touching communication
is infected with presumptive invalidity.
The objection to summarizing this line of thought by the phrase "the
preferred position of freedom of speech" is that it expresses a complicated
process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula. And it was
Mr. Justice Holmes who admonished us that "To rest upon a formula is
a slumber that, prolonged, means death." Such a formula makes for
mechanical jurisprudence.170
Justice Frankfurter rejected any notion that speech was any more preferred
a liberty than any other provision of the Bill of Rights. Instead, he espoused
a balancing approach where the Court would weigh free speech with interests
such as security, privacy or other state and federal governmental concerns.
The 1940's Court applied a clear and present danger test to information
broadcast from sound trucks,' 7' free press versus fair trial, 7 and disorderly
167. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
168. Id. at 52.
169. Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
170. Id. at 90, 96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The idea of preferred
rights or freedoms, and presumptive invalidity arising therefrom, was proferred by Justice Stone
in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938): "There may be narrower scope
for the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments." Id. at 152
n.4.
171. Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
172. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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speech. 173 The clear and present danger test today lies in constitutional limbo,
seldom cited, often disparaged, but never overruled. 7 4
Instead, the Court remains divided over the issue of free speech. Some
Justices follow the doctrine espoused by Justice Black and contend that the
first amendment is an absolute prohibition on any or all laws regulating
speech. Justice Black stated his position this way: "My view is, without
deviation, without exception, without any ifs, buts, or whereases, that free-
dom of speech means that you shall not do something to people either for
the views they have or the views they express or the words they speak or
write." 75 This absolutist approach to the first amendment 7 6 has been rejected
by a majority of the Courts that prefer to balance freedom of speech with
other competing state and federal government concerns. 77
After the first amendment became applicable to states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the police and reserved powers
left to states became new weights on a first amendment scale. The United
States Supreme Court was not accustomed to petty city and state problems
associated with typical issues such as noise versus speaker, property versus
access to speak or developer versus conservationist. These clashes require a
person-to-person analysis and weighing of competing concerns, which the
Supreme Court cannot perform well.
Local law, government and constitutions were designed to balance and
resolve citizen disputes in petty affairs. At the Supreme Court level, states
are today mere appellants or respondents. They no longer arbitrate but
instead appear in constitutional litigation as a disputant. The Court ultimately
does their balancing for them.
Nobody in 1787, 1791 or 1868 dreamed that states would be routinely
sued by their own citizens before the United States Supreme Court. Moreover,
173. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
174. The clear and present danger test has many problems. Suppose the danger was clear
but not present (Communism), or present but not emphatically clearly evil (obscenity)? Is this
a question of law or a question of fact? And suppose Congress or a state finds that certain
speech is a clear and present danger? In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the Supreme
Court put clear and present danger into a footnote. Justice Black wrote in his concurring
opinion:
I agree with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion
in this case that the "clear and present danger" doctrine should have no place in
the interpretation of the First Amendment. I join the Court's opinion, which, as I
understand it, simply cites Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) but does
not indicate any agreement on the Court's part with the "clear and present danger"
doctrine on which Dennis purported to rely.
Id. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring).
175. Cohn & Black, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview,
37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 559 (1962).
176. "The great danger of the judiciary balancing process is that in times of emergency and
stress, it gives Government the power to do what it thinks necessary to protect itself, regardless
of the rights of individuals." Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 878 (1960).
177. See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1443 (1962).
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the effect of balancing free speech rights with concerns that were not part
of the original first amendment requires a watered down version of the first
amendment in state cases. The effect of balancing speech in the local context
in a manner unresponsive to differing federal or national concerns is to
create two versions of one amendment. Some of us have often wondered
why federal obscenity law should be determined by local standards, 17  or
how an interstate federal disorderly conduct statute came to be. 79 The Court
has enough problems in areas such as congressional regulation of speech,
national security, political, commercial, corporate expression and the Federal
Communications Commission. Nevertheless, it continues to be mired in state
issues.
Too much litigation breeds a constitutional law of blurred, indistinct and
hopelessly divided pluralities. The establishment clause is a case in point.
The framers intended the establishment clause to prohibit the designation of
a national church. s0 One hundred and fifty years later in Cantwell v.
Connecticut,'8 ' the Court made the establishment clause applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. One of Jefferson's many meta-
phors had become yet another liberty "implicit" in an ordered liberty of
due process:
We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants,
deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty em-
bodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.82
The effect of incorporating the establishment clause without a shred of
historicity has led to the very clash the framers were seeking to avoid. This
is the clash between accommodation and separation. Today every benefit to
religion legislated by a state tends to establish religion, but when the benefit
is denied, a violation of free exercise is alleged.
178. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Does the first amendment protect a high
school student from punishment for delivering a speech containing sexual innuendo? In Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), the respondent alleged a violation of
his first amendment rights to freedom of speech and sought injunctive relief and monetary
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court held that the school's sanctions violated
respondent's right to freedom of speech under the first amendment, that the school's disruptive-
conduct rule was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal of respondent's
name from the graduation speakers list violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The United States Supreme Court reversed the award. Id. at 3167.
179. 1968 Federal Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1968).
180. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2516 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
181. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
182. Id. at 303.
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The Supreme Court forbids excessive entanglement of a state with reli-
gion.'83 However, the Court itself is entangled in finding religious purpose
or effect in state measures.8 4 Recently, after an invocation for divine prov-
idence, the Court declared unconstitutional an Alabama statute that provided
for a moment of silence. 85 The statute specifically stated that voluntary
prayer was one of the authorized activities during that moment of silence. 8 6
The Court found that the one minute period "for meditation or voluntary
prayer" was motivated by a desire to advance religion.'8 7 The religion area
is a catch-22 because the measures must be supervised to ensure that the
laws remain nonsectarian, but in doing so one must embrace forbidden
entanglement. 118
Many years ago, Justice Jackson wrote:
It is idle to pretend . . . that the task is one for which we can find in the
Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide where the secular
ends and the sectarian begins .... Nor can we find any guidance in any
other legal source. It is a matter on which we can find no law but our
own pre-possession."s9
More recently, Justice Rehnquist, totally disillusioned by the prevailing
entanglement test in state cases, wrote bitterly:
If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the amendment it
seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results, I
see little use in it. The "crucible of litigation," has produced only consistent
unpredictability, and today's effort is just a continuation of "the Sisyphean
task of trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct and variable
barrier' described in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 1'0
Today there are many shrill voices proposing amendments authorizing
prayer in school.' 9' There are several causes of this development, not the
183. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664
(1970).
184. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (creches); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983) (chaplains); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (textbooks); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (church-related college construction); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971) (teacher salaries); Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemp-
tions); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (evolution); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading).
185. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
186. Id. at 2481.
187. Id. at 2493.
188. In his dissent in Wallace, Justice Rehnquist sets out some of the cracks in the due
process religion wall. Id. at 2518-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
189. 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948).
190. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2519-20 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
191. A proposed constitutional amendment, designed to permit prayer in public schools,
failed to get the requisite two-thirds majority in the United States Senate. The proposed
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least of which is the 1890 misconstruction by which due process of law could
became anything or maybe everything.
IX. DUE PROCESS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Is it, or is it not, a good thing that the legislation enacted by each state
to meet local conditions and to regulate local relations should be stand-
ardized by being forced to comply to a new definition of "liberty" applied
to every State by the judicial branch of the National Government.
Charles Warren 92
The fourth amendment protects people and their papers and effects from
unreasonable searches by federal officials. Each state in its own Bill of Rights
also has a search and seizure clause. 93 In 1914, the Supreme Court decided
that items seized illegally would be inadmissible in federal prosecutions. 94
Exclusion of illegally gathered evidence was a judge-made remedial rule
designed as a deterrent to police misconduct. Another rationale for excluding
illegally seized evidence is the belief that courts should not condone illegality
by using tainted evidence.' 9
In 1949, the Supreme Court, using the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, casually made another liberty applicable to the states. In Wolf
v. Colorado, '96 the Supreme Court affirmed a state conviction but grabbed
immense new jurisdiction by making the fourth amendment applicable to
every criminal court in America. The Court wrote, "The security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty and as such enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause."' 9
Justice Frankfurter, author of the Wolf decision, was a somewhat con-
servative, federalist judge. He believed that only the fourth amendment, not
amendment stated:
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or group
prayer in public schools or other public institutions. No person shall be required
by the United States or by any state to participate in prayer. Neither the United
States nor any state shall compose the words of any prayer to be said in public
schools.
S.J. Res. 218, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
192. See Warren, supra note 102, 464-65.
193. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585
(1926). Article IV of the Constitution requires all states to have a republican form of government,
and this includes a Bill of Rights.
194. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
195. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 435 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
196. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
197. Id. at 30.
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the exclusionary rule, should be binding on the states. Justice Frankfurter
noted:
Granting that in practice the exclusionary rule may be an effective way of
deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as
falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a
State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would
be equally effective. 198
Justice Black concurred in Wolf's rejection of the exclusionary rule, as he
was not one to add new words to the exact language of the Bill of Rights:
"I agree with what appears to be a plain implication of the Court's opinion
that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the fourth amendment
but is a judicially-created rule of evidence which Congress might negate."' 99
The notion in Wolf that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the states
created constitutional problems for the Court. After all, there is only one
fourth amendment. A watered down bi-level version of the fourth amendment
would be arbitrary, but a consistent federal-state approach might be unre-
sponsive to local concerns and conditions. It must have been difficult during
the period from 1949 to 1961 for the Supreme Court to apply one version
of the fourth amendment to a federal case in the morning and a different
version to a state case in the afternoon. During this time state convictions
based on illegally seized evidence were reversed only if the offending conduct
was deemed "shocking to the conscience of the Court. ' ' 2°° Justice Black,
who sat in Congress during the early era of economic liberty and due process,
was disturbed by the Court's use of its collective conscience to determine
whether the fourth amendment was violated. In 1961 Justice Black com-
plained:
The majority emphasize that these states do not refer to their own con-
sciences or to their sense of justice and decency. For we are told that we
may not draw on our merely personal and private notions ....
If the Due Process Clause does vest this Court with such unlimited
power to invalidate laws, I am still in doubt as to why we should consider
only the notions of English speaking peoples to determine what are im-
mutable and fundamental principles of justice. Moreover, one may well
ask what avenues of investigation are open to discover "canons" of
conduct so universally favored that this Court should write them into the
Constitution?20'
198. Id. at 31.
199. Id. at 39-40. Black reached exclusionary results by claiming that the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment excluded objects or real evidence. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
200. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Compare Rochin v. California with Brechaupt
v. Alsann, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The "shock the conscience" test for fourth amendment
procedures is very much alive. See Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985) (court-ordered
surgery to remove a bullet from defendant was found unreasonable).
201. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
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Justice Frankfurter was also disturbed with the Court's interpretation of
the fourth amendment in state cases. In Elkins v. United States,202 Justice
Frankfurter observed that:
The divisions in this Court over the years regarding what is and what is
not to be deemed an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and the shifting views of members in the Court in this regard,
prove that in evolving the meaning of the Fourth Amendment the decisions
of this Court have frequently turned on dialectical niceties and have not
reflected those fundamental considerations of civilized conduct on which
applications of the Due Process Clause turn.203
In 1957, police officers with a phony search warrant seized obscene material
from Dolly Mapp. 204 Mapp was convicted of a knowing possession of
obscenity. 205 Dolly appealed her conviction on grounds other than the exclu-
sionary rule.20 The Supreme Court, however, saw this case as an opportunity
to overrule Wolf. Under the flexible contours of the due process clause,
Mapp v. Ohio made the exclusionary rule applicable to the states. 20 7
In one fell swoop, the Supreme Court obtained new jurisdiction to reverse
convictions in every criminal trial court in the country. The plurality wrote:
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be
secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore,
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an
empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no
longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in
the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.08
All the federal problems were now a shared experience with the fifty
states. 209 Only due process could attempt to promulgate a universal federal-
state standard of reasonableness. 10 Incorporation is but a beginning.
Once the United States Supreme Court makes amendments applicable to
the states by due process, it creates new areas of jurisdiction found only in
the penumbras of the newly incorporated amendments. The Court possesses
a mandate to find in the incorporated liberties newer life and substance. In
state cases under the fourteenth amendment there is no framer's intent,
202. 364 U.S. 217 (1960).
203. Id. at 238.
204. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644-45 (1961).
205. Id. at 643.
206. Id. at 646 n.4.
207. Id. at 660.
208. Id.
209. See Waite, Whose Rules? The Problem of Improper Police Methods, 48 A.B.A. J.
1057, 1058 (1962).
210. See Cameron & Lustiger, The Exclusionary Rule: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 101 F.R.D.
109 (1984).
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original history or clumsy precedent to hinder the Court's ongoing quest. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,211 the Supreme Court found a penumbra due
process right of "privacy" in the fourth amendment. 212  In 1973 the liberty
to abort in the first trimester became an emanation of privacy rights. In
Roe v. Wade,213 the Supreme Court majority wrote:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as
we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amend-
ment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 214
The "blessing of liberty" in Roe was, as the dissent notes, "an exercise of
raw judicial power. ' 215 The 1890 misconstruction made all this possible.
X. MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
Once the verbiage is pared away it is obvious that this Court today adopts
the views of the District Court "that to cut off a welfare recipient in the
211. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
212. Justice Black wrote in his dissent in Griswold:
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed
right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee
another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning.
This fact is well illustrated by the use of the term "right of privacy" as a
comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreason-
able searches and seizures. "Privacy" is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept
which can be easily be shrunken in meaning but which can [also] easily be interpreted
as a constitutional ban against many things other than searches and seizures.
Id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting). This revealing quote explains Justice Black's 1947 dissent in
Adamson v. California, where he first espoused the view that the fourteenth amendment due
process clause incorporated the federal Bill of Rights and absolutely nothing more. 322 U.S.
46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black was not alone in finding solace from due
process in the specificity of federal amendments. In 1943, Justice Jackson wrote:
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it
also collides with the principles of the First is much more definite than the test
when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process
clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the first amendment become its
standard.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). By 1952 he had changed
his mind:
The history of criminal libel in America convinces me that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not incorporate the First, that the powers of Congress and of the States
over this subject are not of the same dimensions and that because Congress probably
could not enact this law it does not follow that the states may not.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
213. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
214. Id. at 153.
215. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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face of... 'brutal need' without a prior hearing of some sort is uncon-
scionable," and therefore, says the Court, unconstitutional.
This decision is thus only another variant of the view often expressed
by some members of the Court that the Due Process Clause forbids any
conduct that a majority of the Court believes "unfair," "indecent," or
"shocking to their consciences." Neither these words nor any like them
appear anywhere in the Due Process Clause ....
Justice Hugo Black 216
Seven years after the passage of the fourteenth amendment, a black citizen
brought a civil rights action against the owner of a coffee house for refusing
him refreshment because of his race.2 1 7 Louisiana law provided for the judge
to make the decision in the case. 21s A judgment for $1000 was entered for
the plaintiff and the cafe owner appealed, insisting that the new due process
clause of the new fourteenth amendment gave him a constitutional right to
have a jury decide the case. 21 9 Chief Justice White, whose opinion was well
Within the mainstream of contemporary constitutional philosophy, wrote:
"The States, so far as this amendment is concerned, are left to regulate
trials in their own courts in their own way. ''220
Ninety years later, a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court declared that
Louisiana and every other state in the Union must award jury trials in all
criminal cases in which a federal court would award a jury trial. 22' Nearly
two hundred years of separate state and federal trial procedures became
unconstitutional as a result of an appeal from the same state construing the
same clause of the same Constitution.
By what power may the Supreme Court decree uniform trial rights for
every state criminal court in the nation? Why is it that the strictures of a
written constitution are subject to such broad interpretation? The answer
lies in the phrase "due process of law." The transformation of the due
process clause from a modest requirement that state procedures be applied
equally to a grant of legislative power to the Supreme Court came in the
constitutional coup d'etat of 1890.
216. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 275-76 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
217. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
218. Id. at 91.
219. Id. at 92.
220. Id. On the original understandings of how the fourteenth amendment should affect jury
trials in state cases, the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879), could not
have been much more emphatic:
If the State of New York, for example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and
its method of procedure for New York City and the surrounding counties, and the
common law and its method of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing
in the Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so.
Id. at 31.
221. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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Procedural due process requires notice, hearing and fundamental fairness
whenever government action deprives one of life, liberty or property. Mis-
cellaneous procedural due process requires a two-step analysis. First, the
Court must determine whether the life, liberty or property interest is of
sufficient worth to warrant any prior notice or procedure before a taking.
Second, the Supreme Court must decide whether the liberty or property
interest requires procedures to protect it and then of what those procedures
must consist.
The greater the state's or the Court's estimate of the particular right,
liberty or property involved, the greater the miscellaneous process due before
this right can be abridged.222 The Court must determine whether mere notice
is enough to satisfy due process requirements or whether trial-type procedures
are required. 223 In 1971, the Supreme Court required notice before the State
of Wisconsin could prohibit an adult of drinking age from buying alcohol. 224
Five years later, however, the Court found that a person's liberty or property
interest in his reputation alone225 was not enough to force a required prior
hearing before circulating a flyer with petitioner's name listed as an active
shoplifter. 226
In Ingraham v. Wright, corporal punishment in high school was held to
trigger fourteenth amendment liberty interests. 2 7 The rest of the opinion,
however, was lost in a discussion of what prior notice or process was due
students other than post hoc resort to state common law damage remedies. 228
It seems to make little difference whether a liberty or property interest is
federal or state in origin, for in all events procedural due process will demand
whatever the Supreme Court says it requires.
222. In Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507 (1986), the Court, assuming
that a student had a property interest, held that a state university's decision to dismiss a student
after the student failed a medical board examination did not so substantially depart from
accepted academic norms to demonstrate that the university failed to exercise professional
judgment. Id. at 514.
223. A procedural due process analysis has been applied in many diverse areas. See O'Bannon
v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980) (nursing home closings); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584 (1979) (medical commitment); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (post-arrest
review); Goss v. Topez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (adoptions); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593
(1972) (review of tenured state employment); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
(public employment dismissals); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 593 (1972) (revocation of drivers license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (welfare benefit termination); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(wage garnishment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency dispositions).
224. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
225. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
226. Id. at 712.
227. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
228. See Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright, The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM.
L. Rav. 75 (1978).
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In criminal cases, miscellaneous due process requires a fair judge and jury
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.129 State and federal law creating
presumptions in criminal cases must be both rational and fair. 230 Miscella-
neous due process also covers state criminal statutes challenged on grounds
of excessive vagueness 23' or over-breadth. 232 Where incorporated freedoms
are involved, state statutes are more likely to suffer close procedural due
process scrutiny. 233 The difference between original procedural due process
and post-1890 due process is that before 1890 there was constitutional due
process whenever there was notice or a trial under the applicable law of the
jurisdiction. 23 Today, state and federal law has absolutely no special dis-
positive significance as to whether a deprivation of life, liberty, or property
requires more procedure than the particular law or statute provides.
There was nothing controversial about the Supreme Court requiring law-
makers, Congress, and the states to follow the procedures that they had
legislated. But after 1890, that is not what happened. Instead, the Court,
without reference to any authority but itself as custodian of the due process
clause, decided what procedures states and the federal government must
follow. Hidden in the Court's required procedures is the majority's view of
values or what is important in life. 235 Original due process was supposed to
be bold, dynamic and capable of change, too, but by creative state legislative
action.236 Today, instead of the dynamics of fifty different state legislatures
229. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 352 (1975) (fair jury required); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond reasonable doubt required); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) (fair judge required).
230. See Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional
Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARv. L. REV. 321 (1980); Nesson, Rationality, Pre-
sumptions and Judicial Comment, A Reponse to Professor Allen, More on Constitutional
Process of Proof Problems in Criminal Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1574 (1981).
231. See, e.g., Colton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
232. See, e.g., Plumber v. Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973).
233. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
234. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1887) (appellants unsuccessfully sought to
have fifth amendment guarantee of just compensation for taking of private property incorpo-
rated into fourteenth amendment due process).
235. See Diver, The Wrath of Roth, 94 YALE L.J. 1529, 1543 (1985).
236. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Court stated:
Due process of law in the latter refers to that law of the land which derives its
authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress . . . . In the Four-
teenth Amendment, by parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land in each
State, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the
State.
Id. at 535. Hurtado held that if a proceeding followed usages of England and this country,
due process was satisfied. Id. at 528. However, as a caveat, the court added:
[I]t by no means follows that nothing else can be due process of law . . . . [T]o
hold that such a characteristic is essential to due process of law would be to deny
every quality of the law but its age and to render it incapable of improvement. It
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enacting progressive procedures, we have a universal due process requirement,
frozen in place by a due process, which, since 1890, may change if the
justices on the Court change.
XI. FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS BECOME APPLICABLE TO
THE STATES THROUGH DUE PROCESS
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at
the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting
down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the
decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating
of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for
any reason undesirable.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes2"
England, before the American Revolution, had experienced witchcraft,
union of church and state, mad kings, a despot named Oliver Cromwell,
fifteen branches of law, nine court systems, and 149 capital offenses.238 Trials
for heresy and treason were most often conducted with a combination of
investigatory and adversary procedures. 2 9 The framers of the Constitution
had this historical background in mind when they devised the American
system of justice.
The Constitution forbids bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. 2M Article
III, section 3, following the definition of treason, provides that "no attainder
or treason shall work corruption of Blood or Forfeiture except during the
life of the person attained." 24 While these measures seemed adequate, those
who drafted the Bill of Rights took no chances.
Following the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the former colonies conducted
criminal trials by adversary rules before juries. The adversary system con-
templated that truth could best be discovered in the clash of parties, opposing
and reacting to each other within the bounds of fairness and relevancy. The
adversary system was a vast improvement for a colonial society accustomed
to magic and trial by wager. 242
would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the
laws of the Medes and Persians.
Id. at 528-29.
237. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
238. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 178-87 (1923); Thayer, Older
Modes of Trial, 5 HARv. L. REv. 45 (1891); Moschzisker, The Historic Origins of Trial by
Jury, 70 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1921).
239. See Currie, Crimes Without Criminals: Witchcraft and its Control in Renaissance
Europe, 3 LAW & Soc'y REv. 7 (1968).
240. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
241. U.S. CONST. art III, § 3.
242. See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1917).
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The system of fact-finding called inquests was popular in European society.
Inquisition procedures combine fact-finding with investigation. 243 The tra-
ditional distinction between the adversarial and the inquisitorial system is
the role of the fact-finder. In the adversary system the fact-finder is passive,
while in the inquisitorial system the fact-finder takes an active role.2"
The fifth and sixth amendments are based on the adversary model. To-
gether they provide a constitutional code of criminal prodedure. Prior to the
the 1960's, only federal courts were bound by the fifth and sixth amendments.
From 1890 to the 1960's, the Supreme Court only occasionally used proce-
dural due process to require the states to follow certain practices and
guarantee certain rights. In 1936, the use of coerced confessions in state
cases was held to violate fundamental fairness. 241 In 1932, the right to counsel
was held applicable to the states in capital cases. 246 The right to counsel was
extended to serious felonies in 1942.247 Using due process, the Warren Court
made specific federal rights and language applicable to the states as restric-
tions *on their freedom of action to abridge or create new procedures in local
criminal cases. 84s
In 1964, the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause was incorporated
into due process in Malloy v. Hogan.249 Less than twenty years earlier,
Justice Frankfurter had written in Adamson v. California:
The notion that the "due process of law" guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment is shorthand for the first eight amendments of the Constitution
and thereby incorporates them has been rejected by this court again and
again, after impressive consideration .... Only the other day the Court
reaffirmed this rejection after thorough re-examination of the scope and
243. A presidential commission, a grand jury, Congressional investigations and a coroner's
hearing are characterized by their inquest procedure.
244. See generally J. WIGMOP, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS (1936). For a
chart that displays the difference between an adversarial procedure and an inquest, see Burns,
State Criminal Trials Adversary or Inquest: Did Due Process Reform the Wrong System, 2
Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 249, 252-53 (1971).
245. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
246. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
247. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 435 (1942).
248. In 1963, the sixth amendment right to counsel was required in all serious state crimes.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The confrontation clause, Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965), the right against self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the
right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1968), compulsory process,
Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S. 14 (1967), and the prohibition against double jeopardy, Benton
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1969), were also soon incorporated. In 1968, the right to a trial
by jury became applicable to the states. Ninety years earlier the Supreme Court in review of
the same clause had written that "the states so far as this amendment is concerned are left to
regulate trials in their own courts in their own way." Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875).
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Supreme Court held that Louisiana and every
other state in the Union must award jury trials in all criminal cases in which federal courts
would award a jury.
249. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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function of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
The issue is closed.250
That's what he thought. By 1970, every single case Justice Frankfurter cited
was either explicitly or effectively overruled.25 But the revolution had really
been over since 1890.
The Warren Court adopted an elaborate array of constitutional procedures
required in all state courts, only to discover in 1970 that most defendants
in state criminal cases waive their constitutional rights and plead guilty. 25 2
A plea of guilty in open court is a voluntary surrender of the right to a trial
by jury, the presumption of innocence, confrontation and freedom from
self-incrimination. 23 A plea of guilty waives most of the very rights incor-
porated by due process. The Supreme Court had reformed what it thought
was an adversary system, only to find that the whole trial system in the
states had been mostly replaced with a de facto inquisitional model admin-
istered by police, prosecutors, public defenders and state judges. 254 How
could a twelve-man jury system, developed from rural England, survive the
population logistics of the Civil War, the Industrial Revolution or the
immigration of millions? What do law enforcement personnel do in a large
metropolitan area when confronted with many thousands of felony suspects?
They practice negotiated justice. 255 Mass crime demands an attrition process
administered by -police, prosecutors and the courts.
How are defendants persuaded to confess guilt to an offense in open
court? There are ways. It is interesting to wonder, for instance, if the greatest
civil rights could co-exist with the world's most numerous offenses and worst
penalties? The rules to plea negotiation are not complicated. Start with the
prosecutor's largely unreviewable discretion to charge, drop a charge, give
immunity, and either recommend, not oppose, or agree to a sentence. Add
the many possible degrees of felonies, misdemeanors, ordinance violations,
multi-offenses, attempts, conspiracy and complex penitentiary release and
probation possibilities, and the prosecutor has the clout to trade. 256
250. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
251. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), was effectively overruled by Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), was effectively
overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936),
was effectively overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965). Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), was expressly overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
252. See Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis to Guilty Plea Practice in the Federal Courts, 89
HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976).
253. Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must address the defendant personally in
open court and inform him of and determine that he understands his rights. FED. R. GRIM. P.
11(a).
254. See Burns, supra note 244, at 261.
255. Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1927); Polstein, How
to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PeAc. LAW. 35 (1962); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compro-
mises by Prosecution to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
256. See Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REv.
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The incorporation of various procedural rights into the criminal justice
process during the 1960's217 was followed by three cases in 1970 using
miscellaneous procedural due process, 21a which set guidelines to assist trial
courts in waiving rights or surrendering the very procedures incorporated to
the states by the same clause. Due process has been busy indeed.
XII. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DUE PROCESS
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but
the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barba-
rous,-something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
Chief Justice Fullers9
The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required nor
excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. ' '260 The
framers of the eighth amendment did not regard the death penalty as "cruel
7 (1970). Waiver is a wonderful legal method to make a false promise and a wrong both right.
As an equalizer, the doctrine describes two contraries-the de jure one that is always pretender
to a more commonplace real world opposite.
257. The incorporated right to counsel includes competent counsel. The defendant is entitled
to confront and cross-examine his accusers, but need not testify himself. Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). It is unconstitutional to comment on his failure to testify. Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The defendant must not be convicted except by sufficient
and untainted legal evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S.
596 (1968), to the satisfaction of all (usually twelve) jurors. The defendant, except in petty
cases, Dyke v. Tyler Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), has a constitutional right to a trial
by jury. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). No race can be consciously excluded from
juries, Donaldson v. California, 404 U.S. 968 (1971), but the jury need not be blue ribbon.
The defendant has the right to a speedy trial. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
The defendant is entitled at all times to be represented by counsel, Moore v. Michigan, 355
U.S. 155 (1957), accorded one-way discovery, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
counsel on appeal, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). At all times the defendant must
be shielded from prejudicial pretrial publicity, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), and
must be convicted only on untainted evidence. Real evidence must have been obtained fairly,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), pursuant to hundreds of rules of the Supreme Court in
the search and seizure area. Confessions are inadmissible, if the result of an illegal search for
real evidence, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Confessions are admissible
when voluntary, if the suspect was informed of his constitutional rights. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Voluntariness must not be left exclusively to the jury. Jackson v. Denno,
390 U.S. 570 (1967). Line-up testimony, if considered unfair, is inadmissible unless counsel for
defendant was notified of the line-up. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 219 (1966). Every
violation of a constitutional decision is deemed grounds for reversal unless the state proposes
it to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967).
258. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
259. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
260. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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and unusual." This conclusion is borne out by the Constitution's own
reference in the fifth amendment that "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury .... -261 As originally written, the eighth amend-
ment was not applicable to states at all. In the 1962 case of Robinson v.
California,2 62 the Court, in striking down a California statute making drug
addiction a crime, formally applied the eighth amendment to the states
through the due process clause. Not until Witherspoon v. Illinois263 did the
Court become interested in the capital crime area. In Witherspoon, the
defendant had killed a policeman. During voir dire the prosecutor excluded
prospective jurors who expressed reservations about capital sentences. 264 The
Supreme Court reversed Witherspoon's conviction on the ground that he
was denied fundamental fairness. 265 The Court reasoned that not everybody
who is opposed to capital punishment would necessarily let it affect their
views in the particular case.2 66
After the Court incorporated the eighth amendment, it began to examine
state capital punishment cases. In 1972, Professor Amsterdam of Stanford
Law School argued before the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia,26' that
capital punishment violated the eighth amendment as incorporated through
due process because it left juries with unbridled discretion as to whom to
execute, and therefore the system was arbitrary and capricious. Only a year
before, in McGautha v. California,261 the Supreme Court held that the due
process clause did not impose limitations on a jury's discretion to impose
the death penalty in capital cases. Instead, the McGautha Court assumed
that judicially articulated standards for capital punishment were simply
unnecessary. 269
Furman was a wonderful case to relitigate the question. Georgia juries
had routinely imposed the death penalty on most blacks but seldom on any
white felons. In Furman, all five Justices in the majority wrote separate
opinions. 270 Two Justices concluded that the death penalty was per se "cruel
and unusual" because the imposition of capital punishment "does not
comport with human dignity" and because it is "morally unacceptable" and
"excessive." '27' One Justice concluded that because death is a penalty inflicted
261. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
262. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
263. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
264. Id. at 513. Witherspoon has been watered to the point of disappearance. See Darden
v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986); Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986); Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
265. 391 U.S. at 522.
266. Id. at 519.
267. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
268. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
269. Id. at 221.
270. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
271. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); 359 (Marshall, J. concurring).
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on the poor defendant but not the affluent defendant, it violated the implicit
requirement of equality of treatment found within the eighth amendment. 272
The other two justices concluded that capital punishment was "cruel and
unusual" because it was applied in an arbitrary, "wanton", and "freakish"
manner. 273 The four dissenters argued that the Constitution itself recognized
capital punishment in the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and that capital
punishment was not considered "cruel and unusual" when the amendments
were adopted.2 74 The dissenters concluded that the majority had simply
legislated its own private views of capital punishment. 275
Some state supreme court justices follow the example of Justices Brennan
and Marshall and dissent in every single capital case on the grounds that
capital punishment is always cruel and unusual. Who can blame them? Hope
springs eternal, especially in the due process of law arena.
276
XIII. DuE PROCESS OF LAW TODAY: ALL SAIL AND No ANCHOR
But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any
of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire
into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circum-
scribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This
court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.
Chief Justice Marshal277
The game of constitutional'due process allows the Supreme Court, under
evolving values and rights, to "review" practically any subject of life, liberty
or property that any four Justices choose from among many thousands of
subjects each term. Justices need give no reason why they hear one decision
on Miranda this term and five the next term, or why they should hear no
272. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 310, (Stewart, J., concurring); 313 (White, J., concurring).
274. Id. at 380 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 408 Blackmun, J., concurring); 414 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Furman has been watered down to the point of disappearance. See McCleskey v.
Kemp, 55 U.S.L.W. 4537 (1987) (rejecting black-white statistical variants in capital context).
276. In Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986), a 5-4 Court held that the eighth
amendment bars the execution of a prisoner who is insane. Justice Powell wrote in his concurring
opinion:
The Court holds today that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of a category
of defendants defined by their mental state. The bounds of that category are
necessarily governed by federal constitutional law. I therefore turn to the same
sources that give rise to the substantive right to determine its precise definition:
chiefly, our common-law heritage and the modern practices of the States, which
are indicative of our "evolving standards of decency."
Id. at 2607. This, of course, is pure due process.
277. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
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cases at all on the subject. 28 Due process is accountable to no one. After a
case or controversy exists, the only ironclad internal restraints on the Court
are a ban on deciding moot questions and a disinclination to decide questions
deemed "political.' '279
The player of the due process game is anyone willing to stake the contest
or appear as a friend of the court (amicus curiae). The player is someone
unhappy with a rule or law enacted by a state, federal or city government.
The player must pay filing fees and/or be willing to appeal or intervene on
appeal. Today most of the players on the main stage in oral argument before
the Supreme Court are lobbyists. The players have no special respect for the
founding fathers' original intent or the fact that the exact question has been
repeatedly decided adversely to their side by many previous Supreme Courts.
Why should they? Due process is not static. As Mr. Justice Douglas once
expressed: "[Hiappily, all constitutional questions are always open." 2w°
Today, federal district court judges, by benefit of section 1983 of title 42
of the United States Code, 281 possess declaratory, injunctive and ancillary
jurisdiction to award damages for the denial of constitutional rights by
states, cities or towns.2 2 Federal district court judges had, in the original
278. A candid Justice Frankfurter put it this way in 1950:
This Court now declines to review the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals.
The sole significance of such denial of a petition for writ of certiorari need not be
elucidated to those versed in the Court's procedures. It simply means that fewer
than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the
lower court as a matter "of sound judicial discretion."
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950).
279. See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (1967), cert. denied sub nom. Mora v.
McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967). But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where local
political elections under state law were replaced with a fourteenth amendment, one man, one
vote national standard, policed today by federal district court judges.
280. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1981). Five civil rights acts were enacted immediately after the
Civil War to give blacks the right to contract, own property, give evidence and enjoy equality
of rights under the new amendment. They were drafted under congressional power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment. The most important of the statutes at the district court level was
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act, 1871):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an action of law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court construed § 1983 to cover any deprivation
of rights incorporated by constitutional due process of law.
282. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAiv. L. REv. 1133
(1977). Municipalities and other legal government units are "persons" that can be sued directly
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where alleged unconsti-
tutional action has been executed under color of state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), to the extent that it holds that local goverments are wholly immune from § 1983 suits,
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scheme of things, no power to create general common law. 2 3 That is all
changed today. Section 1983 may be used to declare, change, award, enjoin
or punish any violation of liberty, property, life or procedure found in the
Bill of Rights as discovered by the reconditioned section 1983.284 When
Monroe v. Pape2s' was decided, there were only a few hundred civil rights
suits. By 1984, the figure was over 25,000.86 The United States Supreme
Court has lately made efforts to stem the tide of section 1983 district court
filings by limiting injunctive relief,28 7 restricting it to actions under color of
state law, 28 expanding immunity for states28 9 or disparaging the abstract
value or importance of the constitutional right involved. 290
In the land of remedies, the Court is gradually sinking into the abyss of
distinguishing preferred from plain rights, or liberty from property inter-
ests. 29' This amounts to an exercise in raw value selection. In Parratt v.
has been overruled. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985); Monell v.
Department of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
283. See Graglia, supra note 92, at 441.
284. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975) (mental health); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare due process);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (loyalty oaths); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (apportionment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(extending counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment). See also
Comment, The Civil Rights Act and Mr. Monroe, 49 CAIrF. L. REV. 145 (1961):
If a party is treated unfairly by a sheriff, county clerk, building inspector, or even
by the state public welfare office, he may seek relief in a federal court. Under
section 1983, a federal judge has the power to decide that the warden of a state
prison should not censor a prisoner's mail, or that a liquor license should be granted
to one applicant rather than to another. He may even review the conduct of
litigation in state courts, as where it is alleged that a state judge made, or is about
to make, an error of law or fact which denied, or will deny, the plaintiff due
process.
Id. at 170-71 (footnotes omitted).
285. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
286. See Note, Is the Section 1983 Civil Rights Statute Overworked? Expanded Use of
Magistrates-An Alternative to Exhaustion, 17 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 361 (1984). See also Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 526 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (from 1961 to 1977, the
number of cases brought in the federal courts under civil rights statutes increased from 296 to
13,113).
287. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (injunctive relief against judicial officers was
improper where nature of threatened injury, illegal bond setting, was conjectural).
288. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (official activities of a public defender
not "under color of state law").
289. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) (plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of
constitutional or statutory rights may overcome defendant official's qualified immunity only
by showing that those rights were clearly established at time of conduct in issue); Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (state not liable for retroactive payment of welfare benefits).
290. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986) (school suspension
case alleging violations of due process and the first amendment).
291. See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (due process losses caused by negligence
are not actionable under § 1983); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (intentional destruction
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Taylor,292 the Court determined that section 1983 remedial relief does not
extend to those rights protected merely by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Taylor plurality held:
The only deprivation respondent alleges in his complaint is that "his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States were violated. That he was deprived of his property and Due Process
of Law." . . . Respondent here refers to no other right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws other than the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter.2 93
Without the due process simpliciter construction, of course, none of the
Bill of Rights would be applicable to state and local government in the first
place. Perhaps it is time to sound the tocsin to end a rootless due process
by proposing a constitutional amendment to restore the phrase to its original
meaning.
XIV. A CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
TO DEFINE DuE PROCESS OF LAW
[T]he ultimate justification for nullifying or saying that what Congress
did, what the President did, [or what the state legislatures] did was beyond
its power, is that provision of the Constitution which protects liberty
against infringement without due process of law. There are times, I can
assure you-more times than once or twice-when I sit in this chair and
wonder whether that isn't too great a power to give to any nine men, no
matter how wise, how well disciplined, how disinterested. It covers the
whole gamut of political, social, and economic activities.
Justice Frankfurter-"
The founding fathers rejected a supreme council of revision to veto or
improve the laws of Congress or the states. 295 Yet, the Supreme Court's
construction of the due process clause has created a committee of unelected
judges with immense powers to determine the nature and quality of American
life. The coup d'etat of 1890, which provided the Court with the power to
review for reasonableness all subjects touching life, liberty or property, left
due process benchless and bereft of precedent or guidelines. Every Supreme
Court since 1890 has been victimized into finding something more to the
of prisoner's property during shakedown search does not violate due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment where there are adequate past deprivation remedies at state law); Moore,
Parratt, Liberty, and the Devolution of Due Process: A Time for Reflection, 13 W. ST. U.L.
REv. 201, 221 n.174 (1985).
292. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
293. Id. at 536.
294. F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER 129 (P. Kurland
ed. 1965).
295. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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clause. This enduring, chaotic process has made the phrase nearly void for
vagueness.
The author proposes the following amendment to the United States Con-
stitution in an attempt to restore the original meaning to the phrase "due
process of the law." Due process of law, when used in the Constitution,
shall refer to procedures according to the laws of Congress or the states.
Equal protection of the law shall refer to state law. Under this amendment,
the fifth and fourteenth amendment will become hinged to state or federal
law as originally intended.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION:
DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN USED IN THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL REFER TO
PROCEDURES ONLY, ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF CONGRESS OR THE STATES,
RESPECTIVELY. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS SHALL REFER TO STATE
LAW. Tins AMENDMENT SHALL NOT OTHERWISE BE CONSTRUED TO DENY
OR ABRIDGE IN FEDERAL COURTS, RIGHTS PROVIDED BY AMENDMENTS I TO
VIII.
With this proposed amendment, the fifth and fourteenth amendment due
process phrases will apply to federal or state law as originally intended. Due
process will become procedural only and amenable to direction by Congress
or the states. 296
296. This amendment would allow the Court, using its rulemaking power, to enact interim
federal procedures. These procedures would be amendable by Congress in the same fashion
that federal criminal law decisions of the Supreme Court today can be reviewed, revised, vetoed
or overruled by an act of Congress. The first, fourth, fifth and sixth amendment procedures
would remain inviolate in federal proceedings.
Many state constitutions use the phrase "due process." In those states, judges could set out
common judge-made rules of due process in criminal and civil matters, but legislation overriding
the judges is also due process and entitled to supremacy. See generally Corwin, supra note 30.
Indeed many statutes remedy defects in the common law as they are developed. See Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
The amendment would abolish a uniform fifty-state Supreme Court-enacted procedure.
Instead, each state could determine procedures under state law for itself and its citizens. This
is wholly consistent with the letter and intent of the phrase in the fourteenth amendment as
used before 1890. Nothing would affect the constitutional requirement that state law be applied
evenly on a non-racial basis.
The phrase "equal protection of the laws shall refer to state law" restores the equal protection
clause to its original purpose. After 1890, equal protection was construed to forbid unreasonable
state law that discriminates generally. A new amendment to define due process would not affect
race statutes, see Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966), or decisions, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) (Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 295 (1955), and its progeny violated the framers' intent to leave the school segregation
issues untouched). See also Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The Activist Flight from
the Constitution, 47 Omo ST. L.J. (1986) (interpretivism or originalism, which maintains that
the provisions of the Constitution mean what the founders intended them to mean, that is, the
"original intention," is a view deeply rooted in our history and our formal constitutional law).
Nor would the amendment alter or affect measures sustainable under the commerce clause
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The amendment would not change Marbury v. Madison,297 supremacy, the
commerce clause, review jurisdiction, race law, the pre-emption doctrine or
review of the Bill of Rights in federal courts. It would, however, restore the
fourteenth amendment to its original understanding and promise of equal
law and procedure under state law. The amendment takes away the power
of judges to rely on the phrase "due process of law" to veto the exercise
of lawmaking powers on the grounds of reasonableness. The phrase "due
process" would now include procedures only.
Both equal protection and due process would no longer be free-floating
concepts, but instead would be defined and anchored to state and federal
law. The selective incorporation doctrine, which retards and stifles state
creativity, particularly in the criminal procedure area, would be abolished.
A formal amendment to restore meaning and power to the fourteenth
amendment is not really that radical. It mirrors a concern found in the
1920's and 1930's that conservative judges had too much power. There was
power, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in
employment practices based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" when an employer
with twenty-five or more employees is "engaged in an industry affecting commerce," defined
as one "in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the
free flow of commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. IX 1974). Thus, commerce clause
jurisdiction would exist without the need for fourteenth amendment substantive due process.
See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding
environmental legislation); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (consumer product
safety). See Senate Hearings, Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 51732 at 1, 2
(1963). When Congress exercises a granted power, federal law may supersede state authority,
and federal law is entitled to art. VI supremacy. See Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1959); Note, Developments in the Law: Federal Limi-
tations on State Taxation of Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953 (1962). Perhaps an amendment
would prompt Congress to express intent and occupy through commerce clause jurisdiction,
areas now shared or dormant. See Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon
of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1960).
The United States Supreme Court would not, however, be able to impose federal standards
on matters that are not procedural. These matters include: 1) state voting apportionment, see
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986)
(plurality review of democratic challenge to Indiana's 1981 appointment representing republican
effort at political gerrymandering); 2) gender discrimination, see Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (male victim of sex discrimination); 3) prayer, see Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (Justice Rehnquist's views on origins of religion clause); 4)
capital punishment, see Greg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Note, The Presumption of Life:
A Starting Point for a Due Process Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351 (1984)
(Supreme Court, by relying on eighth amendment rather than due process clause in capital
punishment cases, has afforded inadequate safeguards from deprivation of life without due
process); or 5) abortion, see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (latest 5-4 opinions on abortion).
An amendment defining due process of law would finally reject the post-1890 notion that
due process of law is to be construed to mean what a Court majority at any given period in
history wishes it to mean and instead restores the phrase to a modest written document allocating
powers to govern and amend or alter laws as our people decide.
297. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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a veritable flood of proposals in Congress to curtail the United States
Supreme Court, which was using due process to strike down economic laws.2 9
Dean Clark of Yale Law School also proposed that due process refer only
to administrative or judicial procedure. 29 Senator Borah of Idaho developed
a similar proposal.?° As Thomas Jefferson stated, "In questions of power
let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from
mischief by the chains of the Constitution."30 1
298. One proposal read, "No court shall have the power to set aside as unconstitutional any
law passed by Congress or the United States." S.J. Res. 3, 74th Congress, 1st. Sess. (1936).
Accord, Note, Shall Due Process of Law be Abolished, supra note 127.
299. See Clark, Some Recent Proposals for Constitutional Amendment, 12 Wis. L. REV.
313, 323 (1936).
300. Id. at 326 n.47. "Due process of law provisions of the 5th and 14th amendments to
this Constitution shall have reference only to the requirements that every person in any manner
aggrieved by an act of another shall be entitled to a fair and impartial trial or hearing and
adjudication of his grievance according to the recognized processes of law." Id.
301. See H. MENCKEN, supra note 25, at 213.
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APPENDIX
The author presents a comparative note to illustrate the due process
differences between a Supreme Court Justice and elected lawmakers.
Vesting Process
Platform
Inventory
Lawmaking Visibility
Level
Change of Law
Term
Recall
Predictable
Term of Service
Voting Number
SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE
President's nomination
and Senate vote
Senate hearings prior to
approval
A few thousand certior-
ari options a term
Cases, written briefs
and oral arguments; ac-
tivist amicus curiae; law
clerks, and the man
himself
Cases appealing to dis-
obedience of prior law
Senate impeachment
None
An effective vote of 5
to 9
STATE OR FEDERAL
LEGISLATOR
Public vote every term
Public avowals before
election, legislative vot-
ing record afterwards
Open
Legislative process: self-
interest, public pres-
sure, lobbies, law re-
views, committees
Platform election, ma-
jority vote and non-
exercise or overriding
an executive veto
Two to six years at a
time
Voters' choice
One term at a time
Many hundreds of
elected representatives
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